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I. INTRODUCTION
This year's Survey is more narrative than previous surveys, and has
changed in two significant ways. First, the Survey is not simply an
exhaustive list of Kansas cases decided in the last year. Instead, this
year's Survey provides an overview of each area of Kansas criminal
procedure. Recent decisions are discussed and incorporated when
applicable and supplemented with United States Supreme Court and
Kansas precedent.
Second, this year's Survey was designed with the goal of providing a
more academically beneficial experience for Law Review staff members.
Each staff member involved added commentary to his or her section,
analyzing either the public policy implications of the court's decision or
the soundness of its reasoning.
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
1I. POLICE INVESTIGATION
A. Introduction to the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'
Although these two protections-freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and the mandate that warrants meet certain
requirements-are contained in separate clauses, the Supreme Court has
intertwined the two clauses by indicating a clear preference for warrants.
In Katz v. United States, 2 the Court stated that searches conducted
without prior approval by either a judge or magistrate are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, "subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 3 In application,
the provisions of the Fourth Amendment apply to actions of both federal
and state governments.4
B. Scope of the Fourth Amendment
1. Limits to the Fourth Amendment's Scope
Only governmental action can constitute a search or a seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment "'was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was
not intended to be a limitation upon ... [non]govemmental agencies.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3. Id. at 357.
4. Although the Fourth Amendment was originally drafted to govern the actions of the federal
government, its provisions have been extended to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
5. Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1541 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
6. Id. (quoting Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465,475 (1921) (emphasis added)).
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Therefore, where a search or seizure is conducted by a private individual,
the action does not fall within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.
Similarly, the Fourth Amendment applies only to "searches" and
"seizures.",7 "If the behavior at issue fails to qualify as a 'search' or
'seizure,' the matter, as far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned, is
over. Police need not establish that their behavior was reasonable or
supported by a warrant, or met any other Fourth Amendment standard." 8
2. Searches and Seizures
A "search" occurs when an expectation of privacy-one that society
is prepared to consider as reasonable-is infringed. 9  A "seizure" of
property occurs within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment "when
there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interests" in property.' 0 Likewise, "[a] person is seized when an officer
accosts the person and restrains [her] freedom to walk away."' 1 A person
can be seized without actually being placed under arrest. 1
2
a. Traffic and Vehicular Stops as Searches
i. The Requirement of Reasonable Suspicion
"A traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment."' 13 In order to stop a moving vehicle, an officer, at the time
of the stop, must possess "articulable facts sufficient to constitute
reasonable suspicion." 14 To determine whether reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity existed to justify the stop, courts use a totality of the
circumstances evaluation.' 5 "Although an officer's reliance on a mere
'hunch' is insufficient to justify a [traffic] stop," courts will consider
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. George Dery III, Remote Frisking Down to the Skin: Government Searching Technology
Powerful Enough to Locate Holes in Fourth Amendment Fundamentals, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 353,
358-59 (1997).
9. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
10. Id.
11. State v. Hill, 130 P.3d 1, 7 (Kan. 2006) (citing State v. Boone, 556 P.2d 864 (Kan. 1976)).
12. Id.
13. State v. Anderson, 136 P.3d 406, 410 (Kan. 2006) (citing State v. Slater, 986 P.2d 1038
(Kan. 1999); State v. Mitchell, 960 P.2d 200 (Kan. 1998); State v. McKeown, 819 P.2d 644 (Kan.
1991)).
14. Id.
15. State v. Poage, 129 P.3d 641, 644 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).
2007)
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both the quantity and quality of information possessed by an officer, as
well as the information's degree of reliability.1 6  Additionally, in
evaluating the facts purportedly supporting reasonable suspicion, courts
consider not only the facts known independently by the officer executing
the stop, but also the facts known collectively by other officers involved
in the investigation. 7 "A traffic violation provides an objectively valid
reason to effectuate a traffic stop, even if the stop is pretextual."'
' 8
In State v. Poage, a convenience store clerk contacted the Olathe
police department at 3:00 A.M., reporting that someone was trying to buy
large quantities of materials commonly used to manufacture
methamphetamine, and that this person "'had been doing that for several
months."'" 9 Based on this information, the responding officer telephoned
a nearby convenience store and learned that a person in a vehicle
matching the description given by the first clerk had purchased or just
tried to purchase other precursor materials.2 0  The first officer then
radioed a second officer located near the second convenience store, gave
him a description of the vehicle and tag number, and told him to stop the
vehicle if he saw it.2' At approximately 3:30 A.M., the second officer
stopped Poage's vehicle and determined that his license was suspended.22
Poage was arrested, his vehicle was towed, and during an inventory
search, numerous precursor materials were found.23 Upon questioning,
Poage admitted that "'he was basically driving around town purchasing
items for a gentleman named Steve or Steven and that . ..Steve was
going to use those items to manufacture methamphetamine."'
24
At trial, Poage was convicted of driving a vehicle with a suspended
license and attempted "possession of pseudoephedrine, ephedrine, and
phenylpropanolamine with intent to use the product as a precursor to any
illegal substance. 5  On appeal, the court considered the merit of
Poage's motion to suppress contraband found in his possession
subsequent to the traffic stop and, in particular, whether the arresting
officers possessed reasonable suspicion that Poage was committing,
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Anderson, 136 P.3d at 410-11.









about to commit, or had previously committed a crime.26 In upholding
the trial court's denial of Poage's motion, the Kansas Court of Appeals
found that the "officers had reasonable suspicion from the facts known to
them collectively at the time of the stop that Poage may have been
engaged in criminal activity.' '27 In reaching this conclusion, the court
indicated that the totality of the circumstances-including numerous
attempts at multiple locations to purchase matches with red phosphorus
strike plates, the quantity of matches purchased or attempted to be
purchased, reliable information that this was a pattern of activity
extending for several months, the fact that the defendant made the
purchases in a different county relative to his home, and the fact that he
made the purchases in the early morning hours-led it to resolve the
question in favor of the State.28
ii. Investigatory Detention
Once a "driver has produced a valid license and proof that he or she
is entitled to operate the car," officers must allow the driver "to proceed
on his or her way" without subjecting the driver to further delay or
additional questioning. 29 "Further questioning is permissible only if (1)
the encounter between the officer and the driver ceases to be a detention,
but [instead] becomes consensual, and the driver voluntarily consents to
additional questioning or (2) during the traffic stop, the officer gains a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in illegal
activity." 30 "In determining whether an encounter between an officer and
a citizen has ceased to be a detention and has instead become a
consensual encounter, [a court] consider[s] whether a reasonable person
in the [citizen]'s position would feel free 'to disregard the police and go
about his [or her] business."'
31
In analyzing investigatory detention situations, courts look at "the
totality of the circumstances in [the] light of common sense and ordinary
human experience. 3 2 Several objective factors that weigh towards a
finding of continued detention include "the presence of more than one
26. Id. at 644.
27. Id. at 645.
28. Id.
29. State v. Anderson, 136 P.3d 406, 411 (Kan. 2006).
30. State v. Hayes, 133 P.3d 146, 152 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v. DeMareo, 952 P.2d
1276, 1282 (Kan. 1998)).
31. Id. (quoting State v. Reason, 951 P.2d 538, 542 (Kan. 1997)).
32. Poage, 129 P.3d at 644.
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officer, the display of a weapon, physical contact by an officer, or use of
a commanding tone of voice., 33 A court may also "consider whether the
officer informed the [individual] subject to the traffic stop of the freedom
to depart.
34
b. Standing to Object to a Search or Seizure
i. Residents and Overnight Guests
As a general rule, a premise's overnight guests and residents have an
expectation of privacy and standing to object to a search of the
residence.35  In State v. Porting, Eugene Hanson was released from
36prison after serving an eighteen-month sentence. As a condition of his
release, Hanson was required to reside at his mother's house.37 At the
time, Hanson's former girlfriend, defendant Porting, also resided with
Hanson's mother.38 Hanson suspected that Porting was using drugs, and,
at the time of his release, he requested that officers search his mother's
residence for contraband.39  Officers subsequently entered the home
without requesting any additional consent, conducted a search, and
discovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in the possession
of both Porting and Porting's overnight male guest.40 "Both defendants
filed motions to suppress the evidence obtained during the search on the
grounds that Hanson did not have authority to consent to the search. ''41
Prior to reaching the ultimate issue of third-party consent, the Kansas
Supreme Court found that both defendants, as a resident of the premises
and an overnight guest, had a valid expectation of privacy and therefore
had standing to challenge the search of the home.42
33. Hayes, 133 P.3d at 152 (citing State v. Moore, 124 P.3d 1054, 1061 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005)).
34. Id.
35. State v. Porting, 130 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Kan. 2006).






42. Id. at 1176.
[Vol. 55
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SURVEY
ii. Standing of a Passenger Who Leaves Her Purse in Car
In State v. Groshong,43 a case of first impression, the Kansas
Supreme Court held that "a law enforcement officer may search a
passenger's purse left in a vehicle [if] the passenger exits . . . [and]
makes no effort to retrieve the purse before probable cause to search the
vehicle develops."44 During a routine traffic stop, the patrolling officer
had the defendant exit the vehicle and sit near the car.45 When the
defendant exited the front passenger seat, she failed to take her purse
with her.46 The patrolling officer subsequently conducted a safety check
of the vehicle and spotted a small bag containing marijuana between the
front seats.47 When the officer announced that he intended to search the
rest of the vehicle-approximately three to five minutes after the
defendant had exited-the defendant requested her purse.48 The officer
refused her request, searched the defendant's purse, and found marijuana
and a smoking pipe inside.49 The defendant filed a motion to suppress
the evidence, claiming that the search violated her Fourth Amendment
rights.5°
The Kansas Supreme Court noted that the issue at hand fell into a
gap between established case law.5' In its analysis, the court
acknowledged two general competing principles: that where probable
cause justifies the search of the vehicle, law enforcement officers may
also search a passenger's belongings left inside the vehicle, as long as the
belongings are capable of concealing the object of the search; 52 and that
an individual maintains a heightened privacy interest in a purse when it is
attached to the owner.5 3 However, the court found persuasive the fact
that when the defendant exited the car, she left her purse in the vehicle
43. 135 P.3d 1186 (Kan. 2006).
44. Id. at 1191.
45. Id. at 1187-88.





51. Id. at 1190; see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999) (concluding that law
enforcement officers can search a passenger's belongings inside a vehicle as long as they are
"capable of concealing the object of the search"); State v. Boyd, 64 P.3d 419, 427 (Kan. 2003)
(finding that an officer cannot search a passenger's purse while searching a vehicle when the officer
has ordered the owner of the purse to leave it in the vehicle).
52. Groshong, 135 P.3d at 1189.
53. Id. (citing Boyd, 64 P.3d at 427).
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and did not immediately assert a privacy interest in it. 54  The court
concluded that because the defendant waited until after the officer had
established probable cause to search the vehicle before asserting claim to
the purse, she no longer had standing to claim Fourth Amendment
55protections.
The court's holding in Groshong is very narrowly tailored. It
purports to apply only when a passenger fails to retrieve a purse, or at
least assert a possessory interest in the item, before probable cause to
search the vehicle develops. However, despite the fine line that the court
has drawn, its decision is likely to cut a deeper path. Of all of the items
that a passenger in a vehicle carries, a purse will contain the passenger's
most intimate and personal belongings. Therefore, the owner of the
purse should be entitled to heightened privacy expectations in the
sanctity of its contents. If, during a traffic stop, the owner is ordered to
exit the car, she may forget to take her purse with her, or in the
alternative, she may leave the purse in the car, not realizing that she is
effectively forfeiting her privacy interests in the purse and her standing
to object to a search. If courts are willing to recognize a heightened
privacy interest in a purse that is attached to the owner, it is a legal
fiction that the same purse, when sitting in a vehicle only a few feet
away, is not protected by the same privacy interest.
C. Arrest
"[A] person is considered to be under arrest when he or she is
physically restrained or when he or she submits to the officer's custody
for the purpose of answering for the commission of a crime. ' 56 The test
used to determine "whether there was an arrest is not based on the
officer's subjective belief."57  Rather, the test is based on what a
reasonable person would believe under the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the incident.
58
1. Kansas Arrest Law
Under Kansas law, a police officer may arrest a person without a
warrant if "[t]he officer has probable cause to believe that the person is
54. Id. at 1191.
55. Id.
56. State v. Hill, 130 P.3d I, 7 (Kan. 2006) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2202(4), -2405(1)).
57. Id. at 8.
58. Id. (citing State v. Morris, 72 P.3d 570, 576-77 (Kan. 2003)).
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committing or has committed [a] felony." 59 "If a warrantless arrest is
challenged by a defendant, 'the burden is on the State to justify the arrest
was not only authorized by the statute, but that it was permissible under
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.' 60  "'The
constitutional validity of a warrantless arrest depends on whether the
arresting officer had probable cause to believe that the person arrested
had committed a felony. '
6'
2. Requirement of Probable Cause
The Supreme Court of Kansas has defined probable cause as the
"reasonable belief that a specific crime has been committed and that the
defendant committed the crime." 62  In determining whether probable
cause existed, the court considers the totality of the circumstances.63
"Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within
the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient to assure a person of
reasonable caution that an offense has been or is being committed and
the person being arrested is or was involved in a crime." 64  "This
includes 'all of the information in the officer's possession, fair inferences
therefrom, and any other relevant facts, even if they may not be
admissible on the issue of guilt."' 65 In addition, the court also considers
"'the seriousness of the alleged offense and the exigency of the situation,
as where immediate arrest seems desirable because of the likelihood that
the suspect will flee the jurisdiction.'
66
3. State v. Oliver
In State v. Oliver, the Supreme Court of Kansas considered whether
officers had probable cause to support the warrantless arrest of the
defendant. 67  The case involved the investigation of a quadruple
homicide in Wichita.68 Before arresting Oliver, the police knew that he
59. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2401(c) (Supp. 2006) (punctuation omitted).
60. State v. Oliver, 124 P.3d 493, 502 (Kan. 2005) (quoting State v. Aikins, 932 P.2d 408, 419
(Kan. 1997)).
61. Id. (quoting Aikins, 932 P.2d at 419-20).
62. Id. (citing State v. Abbott, 83 P.3d 794, 797 (Kan. 2004)).
63. Id.
64. State v. Hill, 130 P.3d 1, 9 (Kan. 2006).
65. Oliver, 124 P.3d at 502 (quoting Abbott, 83 P.3d at 797).
66. Id. (citing Aikins, 932 P.2d at 420).




and one of the victims, Raeshawnda Wheaton, shared a violent romantic
history.69 They also knew that Oliver was a gang member and that two
of the victims were affiliated with a rival gang. 70 There had been no
forced entry into the home where the murders took place, leading police
to believe that the shooter was probably familiar with the victims.
71
Additionally, "[w]hile at the crime scene, a police officer had received a
sheet of paper with [the] defendant's name written on it from an
unidentified person.' ' 72 Parents of the victims also reported that Oliver
had pulled a gun on Wheaton and had threatened to kill her two days
prior to the murders. 73 Finally, police searched a house associated with
Oliver and found a handgun of the same caliber as one of the weapons
used during the homicide.74 At trial, following Oliver's warrantless
arrest, the defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree
premeditated murder and two counts of felony murder.75
On appeal, Oliver argued that the facts known to the police at the
time of his arrest "were insufficient to supply probable cause for a
warrantless seizure of his person., 76  After considering all of the
information in the possession of the police and other circumstances-
including Oliver's failure to inquire about Wheaton, officers' reasonable
belief that Oliver might leave Wichita, and the seriousness of the crimes
under investigation-the court concluded that Oliver's warrantless arrest
met both Kansas statutory and constitutional requirements.77
It has been argued that allowing a warrantless arrest "bypasses the
safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause,
and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-
event justification for the arrest or search. 78 However, in cases like
Oliver, this argument is less convincing. Balancing the interests
involved only validates the outcome of the court's holding. Although
Oliver did have a valid interest in having a magistrate decide whether
enough evidence existed to support the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest, the community's cumulative interest in immediately arresting a
quadruple-homicide suspect legitimately outweighed his personal






75. Id. at 501.
76. Id. at 502.
77. Id. at 503.
78. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
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interests. Additionally, following Oliver's detainment, his arrest was still
subject to judicial review on the issue of whether probable cause existed.
In the end, Oliver still received procedural protections, but these
protections were justifiably postponed in light of the public's interest in




Under the knock-and-announce rule, law enforcement officers,
before searching a residence, are generally required to "announce their
presence and provide residents an opportunity to open the door."
79
However, courts have held that it is not necessary to knock and announce
when "'circumstances presen[t] a threat of physical violence,' or if there
is 'reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance
notice were given,' or if knocking and announcing would be 'futile."'
8°
In Hudson v. Michigan, the United States Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether a violation of the knock-and-announce rule requires
the suppression of all evidence found during a subsequent search.8'
Police obtained a warrant authorizing a search for drugs and firearms at
the home of the petitioner, Booker Hudson.82 When the police arrived to
execute the warrant, they announced their presence, but then only waited
about three to five seconds before turning the knob of the unlocked front
door and entering Hudson's home.83 Once inside, the police found large
quantities of drugs, including cocaine rocks in Hudson's pockets.84
Police also found a loaded gun lodged between the cushion and the
armrest of the chair in which Hudson was sitting.85 Hudson moved to
suppress all of the incriminating evidence, arguing that the premature
entry violated his Fourth Amendment rights.86 The trial court granted
79. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2006) (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S.
927, 931-32 (1995)).
80. Id. at 2162-63 (quoting Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936; citing Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S.
385, 394 (1997)) (alteration in original).
81. Id. at 2163. In Wilson v. Arkansas, the Court had previously declined to decide this issue.
Wilson, 514 U.S. at 937 n.4.







Hudson's motion but, on appeal, was reversed. 87  Hudson was
subsequently convicted of drug possession.88
The State of Michigan conceded that the entry constituted a violation
of the knock-and-announce requirement, allowing the Court to focus
solely on remedy. 89 In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that
violations of the knock-and-announce rule do not justify suppressing the
evidence of guilt.90 The Court noted that suppression of evidence has
always been used as a last resort and that the exclusionary rule generates
substantial social costs. 9' These costs include sometimes setting the
guilty free and the dangerous at large.92 In addition, the Court stated that
the constitutional violation of an illegal manner of entry was not a but-
for cause of obtaining the evidence; police would have executed the
warrant they had obtained and would have discovered the gun and drugs
inside the petitioner's house regardless of the illegal manner of entry.
93
Finally, the Court indicated that the knock-and-announce rule has never
protected an individual's interest in preventing the government from
seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant. 94 The Court concluded
that because the interests that were violated in the case-protection of
human life where an unannounced entry provokes violence in self-
defense, protection of property, and interests of privacy and dignity-had
nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence, the exclusionary rule is
inapplicable.
95
The Court's holding in Hudson seriously erodes the requirement of
knocking and announcing before executing a search warrant. Indeed, a
substantial deterrent to performing no-knock entries has been washed
away, whereas the incentives to forgo the requirement-fearing that a
suspect will flee, minimizing life-threatening resistance, or concealing or
destroying evidence of a crime-still remain intact. Under the Court's
ruling, if police possess a valid search warrant, there really is no effective
penalty to deter officers from entering a residence prematurely. They are
no longer restrained by the fear that evidence found following knock-
and-announce violations will be excluded. The Court suggests that a
deterrent to knock-and-announce violations still lies in civil rights
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2163.
90. Id. at 2168.
91. Id. at 2163 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2164.




violation suits, 96 but this alternative's effectiveness in preventing
constitutional violations remains to be seen.
2. Anticipatory Warrants
An anticipatory warrant is a warrant based upon an affidavit that at
some future time, certain evidence of crime will be located at a specified
place.97 Most anticipatory warrants subject their execution to some
condition precedent other than the passage of time--often called a
"triggering condition." 98  These warrants are no different in principle
from ordinary warrants. They require a magistrate to determine that it is
now probable that contraband, evidence of a crime, or a fugitive will be
on the described premises when the warrant is executed in the future.
99
For a conditioned anticipatory warrant to comply with probable-cause
requirements, it must be true not only that if the triggering condition
occurs there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place, but also that there is probable cause to
believe the triggering condition will occur.
00
In United States v. Grubbs, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether anticipatory warrants were lawful. 10 ' The case revolved around
the purchase of a videotape containing child pornography from a website
operated by an undercover postal inspector. 102 Officers from the Postal
Inspection Service arranged a controlled delivery of the videotape to
Grubbs's residence. 10 3 Prior to the videotape's delivery, an inspector
submitted a search warrant application to a magistrate judge with an
affidavit describing the operation in detail. 0 4  The judge issued the
warrant and two days later the videotape was delivered. 05  Postal
inspectors then executed the warrant, detained Grubbs, and searched his
home for contraband. 10 6  Grubbs subsequently moved to suppress
evidence seized during the search, arguing that because the triggering
condition which would have established probable cause had not yet been
96. Id. at 2166-68.
97. United States v. Grubbs, 126 S. Ct. 1494, 1498 (2006).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1500.
100. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).








satisfied when the warrant was issued, the anticipatory warrant
contravened the Fourth Amendment's provision that "'no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause."'
10 7
In rejecting his argument and finding the warrant valid, the Court
noted that "[b]ecause the probable-cause requirement looks to whether
evidence will be found when the search is conducted, all warrants are, in
a sense, 'anticipatory."",10 8 The Court found that the occurrence of the
triggering event-successful delivery of the videotape to Grubbs's
residence-would plainly establish probable cause for the search. 109 In
addition, the Court found that the inspector's affidavit established
probable cause to believe the triggering condition would be satisfied. 110
The Court reasoned that although it was possible that Grubbs could have
refused delivery of the videotape he had ordered, that was unlikely."'
Therefore, the Court concluded that the magistrate possessed a
substantial basis for finding that probable cause existed."
12
E. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution instructs that "[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."
'"13
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they
fall within a recognized exception. 114  Kansas recognizes eight
exceptions to the warrant requirement. These include "consent, search
incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause plus exigent
circumstances, the emergency doctrine, inventory searches, plain view or
[touch], and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses.'IS
This subpart addresses these exceptions as they are currently applied in
Kansas.
107. Id. at 1499.
108. Id.




113. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
114. See State v. Rupnick, 125 P.3d 541, 547 (Kan. 2005) ("[A] warrantless seizure is per se
unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized exception."); State v. Canaan, 964 P.2d 681, 687
(Kan. 1998) ("Unless a search falls within one of a few exceptions, a warrantless search is per se
unreasonable." (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967))).




Consent issues arise in several contexts, including consent to search
and consent to questioning. Consent is defined as an "agreement,
approval, or permission as to some act or purpose."'" 16 Voluntary consent
is "[c]onsent that is given freely and that has not been coerced."
'" 7
a. Voluntariness Requirement
Any consent given must be given "voluntarily, intelligently, and
knowingly, and proved by a preponderance of the evidence. '  State v.
Kermoade reaffirms the voluntariness requirement: "we must still
consider if the subsequent consent to search was voluntary." ' 19 Totality
of the circumstances applies when determining voluntariness: "the
essential inquiry . . . is whether [the consent] was the product of the
accused's free and independent will.' 120  To determine this, a court
should consider whether any threats or coercive tactics were used by
authorities, whether the person was informed of his right to deny
consent, and the intelligence of the person being searched.'12 Regardless,
"knowledge of the right to refuse consent is not a prerequisite to a
finding of voluntariness."
22
b. Search of a Home
While the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights both prohibit
warrantless entries into homes,' 23 "'[t]he prohibition does not apply...
to situations in which voluntary consent has been obtained, either from
the individual whose property is searched ... or from a third party who
possesses common authority over the premises."",124 In State v. Porting,
116. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 323 (8th ed. 2004).
117. Id.
118. State v. Dwyer, 14 P.3d 1186, 1188 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000).
119. State v. Kermoade, 105 P.3d 730, 736 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005).
120. Id.
121. State v. Moore, 124 P.3d 1054, 1064 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005).
122. Id. (citing State v. Holmes, 102 P.3d 406 (Kan. 2004)).
123. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980) (stating the Fourth Amendment
prohibits warrantless or nonconsensual entry); State v. Mendez, 66 P.3d 811, 817 (Kan. 2003)
(analogizing Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights to the Fourth Amendment).




Hanson, a recent parolee, was required to take up residence with his
mother in the home he had lived in for several years prior to his time in
prison. 15 Hanson requested that his supervising officer make a sweep of
the house for drugs "because he knew [the defendant,] Porting, [was]
rumored to be using drugs at the house.' 2 6  Without getting any
additional consent from Hanson's mother or defendants Porting and
Angel, the officer conducted a search whereupon he found defendants in
possession of methamphetamines and drug paraphernalia. 27  Both the
trial court and a split Kansas Court of Appeals denied defendants'
motions to suppress by finding that Hanson's consent was a valid third-
party consent "because he was a resident of the house based on his
physical presence and intent to remain there permanently,"' 28 despite not
having lived there for eighteen months. 29  In reversing the court of
appeals, the Kansas Supreme Court relied on the court of appeals's
erroneous application of State v. Ratley. 130  Ratley applies to spousal
consent to search and sets forth factors to consider when determining if
common authority or a sufficient relationship exists to qualify as valid
consent.131 When applying these factors to the case at hand, the Kansas
Supreme Court found that there was no marital relationship or any actual
or intended joint occupancy of the house. 132 It also demonstrated that the
record was silent as to whether Hanson had any legal interest in the
residence, how long he lived there prior to his incarceration, whether he
left any personal effects at the residence, whether he had conferred with
the residents of the home about his planned return, or whether he had a
key to the residence. 33 Based on the deficiencies in the record-that
"there was no evidence of current joint occupancy, no spousal
relationship giving rise to common authority, and no mutual use of or
access to the residence for the past 18 months"-the court reversed and
remanded. 
3 4
125. Id. at 1175.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1176.
129. Id. at1175.
130. 827 P.2d 78 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992).
131. Porting, 130 P.3d at 1177-78 (quoting Ratley, 827 P.2d at 80, 81). These factors include:
the nonoccupying spouse's retention of a key to the premises; the nonoccupying spouse's access to
the property; changed locks; the length of time the nonoccupying spouse is away from the premises;
whether the nonoccupying spouse left personal property on the premises; and the reason for the






While the court was correct in its decision given the stipulated facts,
the case may have easily gone the other way had the State provided more
evidence of Hanson's relation to the residence. The court focused on
Hanson's relationship to defendant Porting, his former girlfriend, but
took no notice of his relation to the residence by way of his mother,
another resident in the home. Just as the court applied the Ratley factors
to the boyfriend/girlfriend relationship, it could just as easily have
applied those same factors to the mother/son relationship. Had the State
argued this in the alternative, it may have been able to sustain a worthy
drug conviction.
2. Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest
The Kansas Supreme Court ruled "[w]arrantless searches incident to
an arrest are permissible."'' 35 The Kansas legislature codified this rule at
chapter 22, section 2501 of the Kansas Statutes. It reads:
[w]hen a lawful arrest is effected a law enforcement officer may
reasonably search the person arrested and the area within such person's
immediate presence for the purpose of (a) [p]rotecting the officer from
attack; (b) [p]reventing the person from escaping; orc) [d]iscovering
the fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of the crime.
Following Chimel v. California, a leading United States Supreme Court
case involving search incident to an arrest, the Kansas Court of Appeals
stated "[t]he purpose for allowing searches of an arrestee and the
immediately surrounding area is to allow law enforcement officers to
remove any weapons and to prevent the concealment or destruction of
evidence."' 37  These purposes are directly in line with section 2501.
However, despite the statute, Kansas courts have continually
contradicted each other regarding what rule to follow when evaluating
searches incident to arrests.
State v. Press stood for confirming the adoption of a broader, bright-
line-rule view of New York v. Belton "in which articles found in a
vehicle's passenger compartment are deemed to have been within the
recent occupant's (arrestee's) control, justifying a warrantless search.' 3 8
135. State v. Abbott, 83 P.3d 794, 796 (Kan. 2004) (citing State v. Payne, 44 P.3d 419 (Kan.
2002)).
136. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2501 (Supp. 2006).
137. State v. Davis, I I P.3d 1177, 1180 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
138. State v. Press, 685 P.2d 887, 892 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984).
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The court in State v. Box, however, chose to follow Chimel, which
determined the scope of searches incident to arrests need be "'strictly
tied to and justified' by the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible."'' 39 It also chose to follow State v. Tygart, which set out
specific factors to be considered when "deciding a motion to suppress
evidence regarding the reasonableness of the scope of a vehicle search
incident to a valid arrest."'140  Press found section 2501 inapplicable'
4'
and Box merely quoted it before moving on to its case law analysis.
42
The Kansas Court of Appeals has finally clarified exactly what courts
should be doing when examining a search incident to an arrest where
previous attempts have failed. In State v. Anderson, the Kansas Supreme
Court recognized that the Kansas statute may be more narrow and
restrictive than nationally established Fourth Amendment case law, but
that this point was of no consequence because one cannot ignore the
plain language of the Kansas statute. 143 Recently, in reference to the
Tygart factors, State v. Vandevelde has given courts a better explanation
of how to apply the Kansas statute and case law-more expansive than
that given in Anderson-stating that "[a]lthough [the Tygart] factors are
helpful when considering the reasonableness of the scope of the search,
our Supreme Court has made clear that a search incident to a lawful
arrest may be conducted only for one of the three purposes under K.S.A.
22-2501."'44 The court must first look to the statute to determine if the
search was lawful before it can use factors and other case law to
determine if the scope of the search was reasonable.
145
Vandevelde has finally accomplished what Kansas courts should
have done years ago. By establishing a solid rule lower courts can
follow, fewer convictions will be questioned based on the previous
wavering views on this issue. As a result, time and the state's money
will no longer be wasted in courts to determine an issue that should have
been clear from the start.
139. State v. Box, 17 P.3d 386, 389 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762).
140. Id. (citing State v. Tygert, 524 P.2d 753 (Kan. 1974)); see also id. at 391 ("Our holding
here is specifically based upon Chimel and Tygart and the unique facts of this case and not based on
the bright line rule of Belton and Press.").
141. See Press, 685 P.2d at 899 ("K.S.A. 22-2501 is merely a statement of a proposition of
general law and refers only to a warrantless incident to arrest search.").
142. Box, 17 P.3d at 388.
143. State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 180, 184 (Kan. 1996).
144. State v. Vandevelde, 138 P.3d 771, 778 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).
145. See id. ("Therefore, it must first be determined in this case whether the search of
Vandevelde's truck was done for one of the purposes under K.S.A. 22-2501 .... ).
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3. Probable Cause Plus Exigent Circumstances
a. Vehicle Searches
As well as recognizing the general probable-cause-plus-exigent-
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, Kansas recognizes
the more-specific automobile exception. 46 Before officers partake in
any warrantless search, "exigent circumstances must also exist which
would justify an immediate search. A commonly applied exigent
circumstance is the 'automobile exception' that allows officers to search
an automobile without a warrant when there is probable cause to justify a
search.'47 More specifically, there must be "probable cause to believe
there is evidence of a crime [contained within] the automobile,"'' 48 and
"the mobility of the vehicle itself provides the exigent circumstances."'
149
The scope of the search based on probable cause is broad: "if probable
cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the
search of every part of the vehicle, including containers which may
conceal the object of the search."' 50 However, if an officer searching has
particular knowledge about a specific container and he finds that
container within the automobile, he or she may not open it without a
warrant. 15
An example of probable cause to search an automobile is when an
officer encounters a strong odor of marijuana emanating from the
automobile. 152 The smell of marijuana serves as the probable cause and
the fact that it is coming from a mobile automobile is the exigent
circumstance. This situation is differentiated from when an officer
approaches a home, a resident answers, and the officer smells marijuana.
While there may be probable cause, albeit weak, there must still be a
showing of exigent circumstances; the smell alone is not enough. 53 This
result is rational because "'[t]he expectation of privacy, with respect to
one's automobile, is significantly less than the privacy expectation
relating to one's home."",
154
146. State v. Delgado, 143 P.3d 681, 684 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).
147. Vandevelde, 138 P.3d at 780-81.
148. State v. Davis, 78 P.3d 474, 479 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).
149. Delgado, 143 P.3d at 684.
150. State ex rel. Love v. One 1967 Chevrolet El Camino Bearing VIN # 136807Z141367, 799
P.2d 1043, 1049 (Kan. 1990).
151. Id.
152. Delgado, 143 P.3d at 684.
153. Id. at 684-85.
154. Id. at 685 (quoting State v. Conn, 99 P.3d 1108, 1114 (Kan. 2004)).
2007]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
b. Hot Pursuit into Third Party's Home
Kansas follows the well-established rule of Payton v. New York that
"'for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on
probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a
dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the
suspect is within.' ' 155  Kansas also adheres to the rule that an arrest
warrant, on its own, is not enough to enter a third party's home. 15 6 What
happens when an arrest warrant, probable cause, exigent circumstances,
and a third party's home combine? State v. Thomas was a case of first
impression in the Kansas Supreme Court. 157 The case asks:
Does the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or § 15
of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights prohibit the entry of law
enforcement officers into a home when officers are in hot pursuit of the
subject of a felony arrest warrant who has fled from a public area into
the house, even though the arrestee does not own or reside in the house,
and even though the officers do not have a search warrant for the
house?1
58
Because the Supreme Court of the United States has not addressed this
issue specifically as it has done in various other exceptions to the warrant
requirement, the Kansas Supreme Court relied on Steagald v. United
States in its determination that entry into a third party's home based on
hot pursuit and an arrest warrant is constitutional.
159
The Kansas Supreme Court was correct in its decision based on
Steagald's recognition that despite the general prohibition of entry into a
third party's home based solely on an arrest warrant, consent and exigent
circumstances can be shown to legitimize the entry. Following
Minnesota v. Olson, in which the United States Supreme Court held hot
pursuit alone justifies a warrantless intrusion into a home, 160 the Kansas
Supreme Court has recognized "hot pursuit" as an example of an exigent
circumstance. 16' As a result, evidence found in plain view, while
pursuing and apprehending the suspect subject to the arrest warrant, is
155. State v. Thomas, 124 P.3d 48, 52 (Kan. 2005) (quoting Payton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573,
602-03 (1980)).
156. See id. at 52-53 (reaching this conclusion by analyzing the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981)).
157. Id. at 51.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 52-53.
160. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).
161. Thomas, 124 P.3d at 55.
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admissible against the owner of the home, despite him neither being a
target of the arrest warrant nor his home subject to any planned search. 1
62
The owner of the home should not be exempt from criminal prosecution
merely because it was unfortunate a pursuit ended in his home. If there
is evidence of a crime, and the owner is responsible for that evidence, he
should be subject to and prepared to face the consequences.
4. Emergency Doctrine
Mincey v. Arizona set out the rationale for the emergency doctrine as
follows:
Numerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth
Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless
entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within
is in need of immediate aid. . . . "The need to protect or preserve life or
avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal
absent an exigency or emergency."'
163
Kansas requires the satisfaction of a three-part test before a warrantless
entry based on emergency will be excused. 164  First, there must be
"'reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and
an immediate need for [police] assistance for the protection of life or
property." 1 65 An objective standard is used to determine whether the
officer's belief was reasonable: would a reasonable and prudent officer
have acted similarly? 166 Second, "'[t]he search must not be primarily
motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence."",167  Lastly, a
"reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the
emergency with the area to be searched," must be shown.' 
68
Thankfully, Kansas courts apply the emergency doctrine with a
certain level of scrutiny. Because it would be quite easy for an officer to
explain a situation in a manner that could reasonably be believed to have
been deemed an emergency, applying this doctrine to the "t" helps deter
abuse in the system. Even if two of the three prongs in the three-part test
162. See id. at 57 (denying "Thomas' motion to suppress evidence based upon the alleged
unauthorized entry into a third-party residence" upon such facts).
163. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d
205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963)) (internal citations omitted).
164. State v. Drennan, 101 P.3d 1218, 1231 (Kan. 2004).
165. Id. (quoting State v. Mendez, 66 P.3d 811, 820 (Kan. 2003)).
166. Id.
167. Id. (quoting Mendez, 66 P.3d at 820).
168. Id. (quoting Mendez, 66 P.3d at 820).
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are met, the Kansas Supreme Court has refused to apply the emergency
exception to the warrant requirement; all three prongs must be
satisfied. 169
There is a distinct difference between the emergency doctrine and
exigent circumstances: 170  ".[T]he emergency aid doctrine is triggered
when the police enter a dwelling in the reasonable, good-faith belief that
there is someone within in need of immediate aid or assistance."",1
71
There is no probable cause that would trigger a warrant because police
are not there to "'arrest, search, or gather evidence."" 72 Even if possible
"criminal activity might account for the feared danger in a given case,
the primary motive of the police will not be to search for evidence of a
crime, but rather to render assistance."'' 73 Conversely, when justifying a
search with exigent circumstances, there must first be a showing of
probable cause that would justify the issuance of a search warrant.
5. Inventory Searches: Vehicles
State v. Teeter tells us that "[i]nventory searches of vehicles serve
three purposes: the protection of the owner's property while it remains in
police custody, the protection of the police against claims or disputes
over lost or stolen property, and the protection of the police from
potential danger."' 74 For the police to establish that an inventory search
was legal, they must first show they gained lawful possession of the
vehicle. 175  The police must have "express authority" or "reasonable
grounds" to impound a vehicle. 76 Two cases are instructive. State v.
Boster, a 1975 case, sets forth examples which give rise to "reasonable
grounds." These include
the necessity for removing (1) an unattended-to car illegally parked or
otherwise illegally obstructing traffic; (2) an unattended-to car from the
scene of an accident when the driver is physically or mentally incapable
of deciding upon steps to be taken to deal with his property, as in the
case of the intoxicated, mentally incapacitated or seriously injured
driver; (3) a car that has been stolen or used in the commission of a
169. See Mendez, 66 P.3d at 822 (demonstrating the court's strict adherence to the emergency
doctrine's three-prong test).
170. Id. at 820.
171. Id. (quoting State v. Jones, 947 P.2d 1030, 1037 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997)).
172. Id. (quoting Jones, 947 P.2d at 1037).
173. Jones, 947 P.2d at 1037.
174. State v. Teeter, 819 P.2d 651, 653 (Kan. 1991).
175. Id.
176. State v. Vandevelde, 138 P.3d 771, 783 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).
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crime when its retention as evidence is necessary; (4) an abandoned
car; (5) a car so mechanically defective as to be a menace to others
using the public highway; (6) a car impoundable pursuant to ordinance
or statute.
State v. Fortune instructs that "[o]nly when a vehicle is found
illegally parked and unattended, or where the person responsible for its
possession is unable . . . or unwilling to instruct the arresting officers as
to the vehicle's disposition or some other legal reason justifying
impoundment exists should the officers assume control over the
vehicle."'1 78 Both cases have recently been cited to determine the validity
of inventory searches. 179 However, the overarching rule that seems to be
applied to determine whether an impoundment is lawful is a totality of
the circumstances test.'
Police do not have a right to indiscriminantly search a vehicle within
their control-"[t]he search must be for the purpose of establishing an
inventory . . . 'not . . . a ruse for a general rummaging in order to
discover incriminating evidence."" 8 ' As a practical matter, though,
"[o]fficers are permitted to exercise judgment in conducting an inventory
search and it does not have to be conducted in an all or nothing
fashion."' 82 Without a stricter rule on how inventory searches are to be
conducted, these searches are open to abuse. The Kansas Supreme Court
should take advantage of the next opportunity it has to review this issue
and outline a better, narrower rule that officers must apply. Perhaps it
could tell officers that the search must be for the purpose of establishing
inventory but must not go beyond what a reasonable officer would do
when conducting an inventory search. Applying a reasonableness
standard rather than allowing the officers to "exercise judgment"
transforms the rule from an individual standard-one officer's judgment
is surely different from another's-to a collective standard.
177. State v. Boster, 539 P.2d 294, 299 (Kan. 1975), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Fortune, 689 P.2d 1196 (Kan. 1984).
178. Fortune, 689 P.2d at 1203.
179. See State v. Shelton, 93 P.3d 1200, 1206 (Kan. 2004) (relying on both Fortune and Boster);
Vandevelde, 138 P.3d at 783 (relying on Fortune).
180. Shelton, 93 P.3d at 1207.




6. Plain View/Plain Feel
In 2002, the Supreme Court of Kansas set out two different standards
for the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Graham
instructs that
[u]nder the plain view exception to the search warrant requirement, a
law enforcement official can seize evidence of a crime if "(1) the initial
intrusion which afforded authorities the plain view is lawful; (2) the
discovery of the evidence is inadvertent; and (3) the incriminating
character of the article is immediately apparent to search
authorities."
83
However, State v. Payne instructs: "'[u]nder the plain view doctrine, if
police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its
incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have
a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a
warrant."'" 84 Despite "immediately apparent" connoting a one-hundred
percent belief, "'[t]he legality of a law enforcement officer's seizure of
property in plain view... is immediately apparent if there is reasonable
or probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity."",
185
Finally, while the two standards are seemingly alike, the Payne standard
fails to include that the discovery of the evidence must be inadvertent.
The court has yet to resolve this inconsistency. State v. Graham is the
better standard; without it, pretextual stops will continue based solely
upon an officer's hunch.
The plain view exception has been extended in two ways. First, it
has been extended to work side-by-side with the emergency doctrine
exception. Once it is established that a law official's entry is
permissible, he "may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the
course of [his] legitimate emergency activities."' 86 Second, it has been
extended to include "plain feel."'
187
183. State v. Graham, 46 P.3d 1177, 1180-81 (Kan. 2002) (quoting State v. Canaan, 964 P.2d
681, 689 (Kan. 1998)).
184. State v. Payne, 44 P.3d 419, 427 (Kan. 2002) (quoting State v. Wonders, 952 P.2d 1351,
Syl. 3 (Kan. 1998)).
185. Id. (quoting Wonders, 952 P.2d at Syl. 11) (emphasis added).
186. State v. Horn, 91 P.3d 517, 526 (Kan. 2004).




Both the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights and the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution assure each person's right
to be secure in his or her person and property against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 188  The law has recognized four types of
encounters that occur between police officers and citizens. 89 The first
type of encounter is consensual and is not considered a seizure.190 The
second type of encounter is an investigatory detention or Terry stop. 1
During an investigatory detention, a police officer may "'stop any person
in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit a crime. ' 192 The officer may
demand the person's name and address and an explanation of the
person's actions.' 93  In addition, the officer may frisk the person for
weapons if done for the officer's safety.' 94 The third type of encounter is
a public safety stop, which allows a law enforcement officer to approach
an individual to check on his or her welfare. For this type of encounter,
the officer must be able to articulate facts that indicate a concern for
public safety. 195 The fourth type of.encounter is an arrest.196 To arrest an
individual, a law enforcement officer must have a warrant, probable
cause to believe there is a warrant for the person's arrest, or probable
cause to believe that the person is committing, has committed, or is about
to commit a crime.
197
In State v. Parker, the Kansas Supreme Court held that a defendant
would not have felt free to disregard the police and go about his business
because his friend had just been searched and arrested. Consequently,
that was the point the officers' encounter with defendant became an
investigatory detention. 98 After receiving a report of men "hanging out"
in a garage at an apartment complex, a Wichita police officer decided to
188. State v. Parker, 147 P.3d 115, 119 (Kan. 2006).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18, 20 (1968) (allowing stops under reasonable
suspicion).
192. Parker, 141 P.3d at 119 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2402(i) (1995)).
193. Id. (citing § 22-2402(1)).
194. Id. (citing § 22-2402(2)).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2401 (Supp. 2006)).
198. Id. at 122.
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see what the men were doing.199 He drove his police car to the complex
and up the driveway leading to the garage. °00 When the officer arrived at
the garage, two men (one later identified as Mikkel Parker) approached
the driver's side of the patrol car before the officer exited his vehicle.
20 1
The officer noticed that Parker was concealing his right hand and became
concerned Parker was armed.20 2 The officer exited the vehicle and asked
both men to lift their shirts and turn around so he could determine if they
were armed.20 3 Once he confirmed that neither man had weapons, the
officer asked one of the men (who identified himself as Hoover) if he
had anything illegal.20 4 Hoover replied he had a marijuana cigarette. °5
At that point, another officer arrived on the scene and searched
Hoover.2 °6 During the search, the officer found a bag of marijuana and
arrested Hoover while Parker watched.20 7
After Hoover was arrested, a third officer arrived on the scene and
was asked to stay with Parker.20 8 Parker then began acting "nervous,
fidgeting and putting his hands in his pockets despite [the officer's]
request for Parker to keep his hands out of his pockets. 20 9 Parker asked
if he could leave and was advised he could not.210 One of the officers
then asked if Parker had "'anything on him."' 211 Parker replied in the
negative, but consented to being checked for drugs. He then pulled what
appeared to be a plastic baggie from his pants pocket.212 Parker then fled
and the officers ran after him.21 3 Once the police forced Parker to the
ground, he discarded the plastic baggie and the officers retrieved it.
214
The contents were later confirmed to be crack cocaine.21 5 Parker was
subsequently charged and convicted of possession of cocaine.
216













212. Id. at 118-19.






The majority determined that Parker consented to a search by
complying with the police officer's request for him and Hoover to lift
their shirts to show they were not armed.217 The majority focused its
analysis on determining when the officers made such a showing of
authority that Parker would reasonably believe he was not free to
leave.2t 8 The court held that this happened when Parker's companion,
Hoover, was placed under arrest. 2'9 Furthermore, the court held that the
evidence was insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion that
defendant had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime.22° Consequently, the police had illegally detained Parker at the
time when the officer asked him if he could check him for any
contraband or drugs.
In a concurring opinion, Justices Beier, Allegrucci, and Lockett
agreed with the court's holding that this became a stop-and-frisk search
when the officer asked the defendant and his companion to lift their
shirts so that the officer could be sure about whether they were armed.
"This was a Terry search for the protection of the officer, and
defendant's prompt compliance cannot be logically or legally equated
with consent. Because the officer possessed no reasonable suspicion at
that point in time to justify such a search, defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights were violated.
221
The logic of the concurring opinion is much more persuasive than
that of the majority. The majority held in one sentence that "[a]lthough
asking them to lift their shirts can be considered a search, both Hoover
and Parker consented to the search by immediately complying with [the
officer's] request without objection., 222 For its authority, the court cited
22324two cases. The first, United States v. Baker,224 held that an officer was
performing a reasonable Terry search by having a defendant raise his
shirt above a suspicious-looking bulge. 2 5  The second, Coronado v.
State,226 held that "asking [a] defendant to raise her shirt was an
unreasonable search because there was no reasonable suspicion that she
217. Id. at 122.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 123.
221. Id. at 124-25 (Beier, J., concurring) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 18 (1968)) (internal
citation omitted).
222. Id. at 122 (majority opinion).
223. Id.
224. 78 F.3d 135 (4th Cir. 1996).
225. Id. at 138.
226. 79 P.3d 311 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003).
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was armed and dangerous.' '227 That case also heavily used Terry in its
analysis to determine the search was not reasonable and, therefore, was
not a valid Terry exception.228 Consequently, even if having Parker lift
his shirt to show he was not armed was a reasonable Terry stop (it is
doubtful the police officer had a reasonable suspicion that the defendants
were armed and dangerous), it still did not fall under the consent
exception to the Fourth Amendment. What we have, then, is the Kansas
court justifying a search as consensual by finding it similar to Terry
searches when they are completely different exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment.
In State v. Hill,2 29 the Kansas Supreme Court drew one distinction
between a Terry stop and an arrest. A police officer was watching a
suspected drug house while waiting for the issuance of a search
warrant. 230 While he was waiting, he noticed two individuals get into a
truck and drive away from the house.23' As the truck drove away, the
officer decided to follow it.232  The officer followed the truck to a
convenience store where the defendant parked and went inside while the
other occupant remained in the vehicle. 233 When Hill left the
convenience store and drove to another location, the officer continued to
follow the truck.2 34 Subsequently, Hill stopped the truck in the street and
let his passenger out.
235
"Because he was concerned that the two would separate and get
away, [the officer] exited his vehicle, drew his gun, ordered Hill out of
the truck, and then commanded Hill and [his companion] to lie on the
ground. 2 36 "Other officers immediately arrived on the scene" and were
told to handcuff Hill and his passenger.237 "The officers then searched
[both men] for weapons and contraband. 23 8 None were found on Hill. 39
Both men were subsequently questioned and Hill was arrested for
and convicted of the manufacture of methamphetamine.240  He
227. Parker, 147 P.3d at 122 (citing Coronado, 79 P.3d at 312) (emphasis added).
228. Coronado, 79 P.3d at 311-12.
229. 130 P.3d 1 (Kan. 2006).
230. Id. at 4.
231. Id.











unsuccessfully argued, to the district judge, that he was arrested without
probable cause when the officer ordered him to get out of the pickup at
gunpoint, handcuffed him, frisked him, and interrogated him.241 On
appeal, "Hill argued... that the trial court should have suppressed both
his statements to the police and the house key found in his pocket
because they were obtained during an unreasonable search in violation of
his Fourth Amendment rights."
242
Not surprisingly, the Kansas Supreme Court held a defendant
handcuffed at gunpoint was under arrest and, therefore, the officer
needed probable cause to arrest the defendant to avoid suppression of
resulting evidence.2 43 While the detaining officer testified he did not
believe the defendant was under arrest at the time,2 44 the court relied on
the totality of the circumstances test laid out in State v. Morris.245 It then
concluded that the encounter between the defendant and the police
officer was an arrest "based on what a reasonable person would believe
under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident."
2 46
Using this test, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that an individual
handcuffed at gunpoint is under arrest.247 Consequently, the court held
that this case did not fall under the Terry stop exception to the warrant
requirement.248
According to chapter 22, section 2405 of the Kansas Statutes, "[a]n
arrest is made by an actual restraint of [a] person . . . or by his
submission to custody., 249 While it may strike one as self-evident that
being handcuffed at gunpoint is an "actual restraint of a person" and,
consequently, an arrest, the trial court, nevertheless, got this one wrong
and the Kansas appellate courts appropriately corrected the error.
F. Administrative Searches and Seizures
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit placed a
limit on the ability of Kansas to enforce a provision of a law allowing for
the random searching of a noncommercial vehicle reasonably believed to
241. Id.
242. Id. at 6.
243. Id. at 7.
244. Id.
245. Id. (citing State v. Morris, 72 P.3d 570, 576-77 (Kan. 2003)).
246. Id. at 8.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 12-13.
249. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2405(l) (1995).
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be commercial in nature.25° Under Kansas law, individuals using
commercial vehicles are subject to random administrative searches to
check for compliance with safety regulations.251 In United States v.
Herrera, a Kansas state trooper encountered the defendant in a pickup
truck driving east on the Kansas Turnpike.252 "The trooper believed
Herrera's truck to be a commercial vehicle under Kansas law because it
had 'dual wheels on the back and a utility bed with a heavy lift hydraulic
lifter on the back, and also there was a sign on the back, a paint sign for a
paint company.' '253 The vehicle, however, fell one pound short of the
weight required to be designated a commercial vehicle.254 After stopping
the defendant, the state trooper arrested Herrera because he could not
produce proof of insurance as required under Kansas law. 255  "The
trooper then conducted an inventory search of the truck, in preparation
for towing the truck from the highway following [the defendant's] arrest.
During that inventory search, the state trooper discovered twenty-three
kilograms of cocaine hidden amidst building materials in the truck's
bed.
2 56
"[T]he Government [did] not seek to justify its stop of [the
defendant] based upon the existence of probable cause or reasonable
suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity. Rather, the
Government justifie[d] the stop only as a random regulatory
inspection.9257  "An administrative search is . . . premised on the
individual subject to the warrantless seizure and search knowingly and
voluntarily engaging in a pervasively regulated business, and on the
existence of a statutory scheme that puts that individual on notice that he
will be subject to warrantless administrative seizures and searches."
258
The court went on to conclude that because the defendant's truck
was not a commercial vehicle subject to the Kansas regulatory scheme,
that scheme could not justify the state trooper's stopping the
defendant. 259  Because that is the only justification the Government
offered for this stop, it violated the Fourth Amendment.
260
250. United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238, 1246-48 (10th Cir. 2006).
251. Id. at 1241 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-2108(b) (1995)).
252. Id. at 1240-41.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1241.
255. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3104(a) (Supp. 2006); Herrera, 444 F.3d at 1241.
256. Herrera, 444 F.3d at 1241.
257. Id. at 1246.
258. Id.




While there are no published Kansas cases on point, it seems likely
Kansas courts would agree with this result. When it last addressed the
issue of administrative searches, the Kansas Court of Appeals relied
heavily on the United States Supreme Court's ruling that "[i]ndividuals
engaged in a closely regulated industry have a significantly reduced
expectation of privacy. '261  Because the justification hinges on the
voluntariness of engagement in activity that will subject an individual to
warrantless searches, it stands to reason that a person not engaging in
such activity has not waived any of his or her expectations of privacy and
the whole justification for the exception evaporates.
It is important to note that this is not a departure or narrowing of the
administrative search exception to the warrant requirement. The Tenth
Circuit made it clear that this exception is alive and well in Kansas when
it decided United States v. Rios-Pinela.262 In this case, the defendant was
stopped by a Kansas Highway Patrolman while driving a truck tractor-
semi trailer on Interstate-35 near Emporia, Kansas. 263 The patrolman
making the stop was a certified Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance
(CVSA) inspector and was required to inspect fifty commercial motor
vehicles annually. 264 "He first saw the commercial vehicle as it exited
the Kansas turnpike in Emporia, Kansas. He noticed that it was from
Arizona and that it had an extremely high DOT number, indicating that
the trucking company was newly formed. About five minutes later, he
saw the tractor-trailer fueling .... 265 He ran the truck and trailer tags,
and learned that they were registered to two individuals from Phoenix,
not the company whose name was on the truck.266 The Kansas trooper
then "left the area to back up another trooper on a stop, then returned to
the tollgate where he saw the truck enter the turnpike and drive north.
He then stopped defendant's vehicle for the sole purpose of conducting a
CVSA inspection." 267 The stop eventually led to the discovery of several
bundles of cocaine.268
The defendant filed a motion to suppress or, alternatively, a motion
to dismiss claiming that the initial stop violated his Fourth Amendment
261. State v. Bone, 6 P.3d 914, 916 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S.
691, 700-02 (1987)) (emphasis added).
262. No. 06-40073-01-SAC, 2006 WL 2710330 (D. Kan. Sept. 30, 2006).
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rights. 269 The court held that because the defendant was "driving a truck
tractor-semi trailer through Kansas, defendant subjected himself to the
[Kansas] laws regulating motor carriers., 270 The court also found that
Kansas "pervasively" regulates its motor carriers of property for hire.
27'
The court then went on to see whether this fell under the umbrella of a
regulatory search.
The court used a three-part test to determine whether a warrantless
272inspection in a closely regulated business is reasonable. First, there
must be a "substantial" government interest in creating the scheme
authorizing the inspection. 273 "' Second, the warrantless inspections must
be necessary to further the regulatory scheme.'
274
"Finally, the statute's inspection program, in terms of the certainty and
regularity of its application, must provide a constitutionally adequate
substitute for a warrant. In other words, the regulatory statute must
perform the two basic functions of a warrant: it must advise the owner
of the commercial premises that the search is being made pursuant to
the law and has a properly defined scope, and it must limit the
discretion of the inspecting officers.,
275
The court then found that Kansas motor carrier inspection laws serve
a substantial government interest, the stop performed by the patrol
officer was necessary to further that interest, and the regulations perform
the same basic functions as a warrant.276  Therefore, there was no
violation in the initial stop of the vehicle by the trooper.277
This case seems appropriately decided. The only difference between
Rios-Pinela and Herrera is the voluntary waiver of Fourth Amendment
protection. Here, unlike Herrera, the driver waived his Fourth
Amendment protection by voluntarily engaging in a heavily regulated
business.
269. Id. at *1.
270. Id. at *2.
271. Id.
272. Id. at *3 (citing United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 2006)).
273. Id. (citing Herrera, 444 F.3d at 1246).
274. Id. (quoting Herrera, 444 F.3d at 1246).






The United States Supreme Court decided in Hudson v. Michigan
that evidence obtained in violation of the knock-and-announce rule does
not necessarily need to be excluded from trial.278 The Court held that
evidence seized in violation of the knock-and-announce rule could be
used against a defendant in a later criminal trial consistent with the
Fourth Amendment. 279 Furthermore, the Court held that judges cannot
suppress such evidence for a knock-and-announce violation alone.
280
Unlike previous cases addressing the knock-and-announce
requirement, the Court did not need to address the question of whether
the knock-and-announce rule was violated, as the State of Michigan
conceded the violation at trial. 281 The question before the Court was
regarding the remedy that should be afforded Hudson for the violation.
282
The majority noted that the Court first adopted an exclusionary rule for
evidence seized without a warrant in Weeks v. United States.283 This rule
was later applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio,284 but limited by later
decisions.285 After discussing these decisions, the Court wrote:
[E]xclusion may not be premised on the mere fact that a constitutional
violation was a "but-for" cause of obtaining evidence. Our cases show
that but-for causality is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for
suppression. In this case, of course, the constitutional violation of an
illegal manner of entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining the
evidence.
286
The Court then distinguished evidence seized in warrantless searches
from evidence seized in searches that violated the knock-and-announce
rule, noting that:
Exclusion of the evidence obtained by a warrantless search vindicates
[the] entitlement [of citizens to shield "their persons, houses, papers,
and effects" from the government's scrutiny]. The interests protected
278. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2006).
279. Id. at 2170-71.
280. Id. at 2171.
281. Id. at 2163.
282. Id.
283. Id. (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).





by the knock-and-announce requirement are quite different-and do
not include the shielding of potential evidence from the government's
287eyes.
The interests protected by the knock-and-announce rule, according to
the Court,. are to protect police officers from surprised residents
retaliating in presumed self-defense, to protect private property from
damage, and to protect the "privacy and dignity" of residents.288 The
Court noted that the knock-and-announce rule "has never protected...
one's interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking
evidence described in a warrant."
289
The majority opinion noted that the social costs outweighed the
deterrent benefits of excluding evidence for knock-and-announce
violations.290  The Court stated that "suppression of all evidence[]
amount[s] in many cases to a get-out-of-jail-free card.",291 The Court
then stated that exclusion of evidence has little or no deterrent effect,
especially considering that deterrents-civil actions against the police
department and internal discipline for officers-already exist.292 The
Court concluded 'with praise for the "increasing professionalism" of the
police force over the last half-century, which it noted makes some of the
concerns expressed in past decisions obsolete.293
Perhaps the most important part of the decision came from Justice
Kennedy's concurrence. Agreeing in part with Justice Scalia's majority
opinion-that a violation of the knock-and-announce rule does not
require a court to exclude seized evidence-Justice Kennedy emphasized
that the Court has not disregarded the knock-and-announce rule through
its decision and that the exclusionary rule continues to operate in other
areas of criminal law per the Court's precedent.294 Justice Kennedy,
agreeing with the majority that civil remedies and internal police
discipline are adequate deterrents for knock-and-announce violations,
went on to note that if a pattern of police behavior emerges that
demonstrates disregard for the knock-and-announce rule, "there would
be reason for grave concern.1
295
287. Id. at 2165.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 2165-66.
291. Id. at 2166.
292. Id. at 2166-68.
293. Id. at 2168.




It seems that the reason law enforcement has experienced "increasing
professionalism" is that police departments fear having improperly
gathered evidence excluded at trial. Without this disincentive, fear of
public pressure or personal safety will provide police officers with
substantially less incentive to knock and announce their presence before
entering the homes of suspected criminals.
While the United States Supreme Court was narrowing application of
the exclusionary rule, the Kansas Supreme Court was expanding the rule
to include fruits of a warrant executed in a county where the issuing
judge lacked authority. In State v. Rupnick,296 police received a warrant
from a magistrate judge residing in Wabaunsee County to examine the
contents of the defendant's laptop computer.297 The search warrant was
then executed in Shawnee County. 298 The police subsequently performed
a search of the computer's hard drive pursuant to the warrant and
retrieved several dozen stolen computer files.299
After finding that the initial warrantless seizure of the laptop was
excepted from the warrant requirement, 300 the court determined that the
subsequent search of the hard drive did not fit into any of the warrant
exceptions.3 1 Consequently, the warrant needed to be valid for the hard
drive search to stand. In evaluating the validity of the search warrant, the
court determined it did not meet the requirements of chapter 22, section
2503 of the Kansas Statutes, stating a warrant is only valid when
executed in the county in which the signing judge presides.30 2 The court
then addressed whether the error was a harmless "technical irregularity"
under section 2511.303 It concluded the warrant's "execution outside the
jurisdiction designated by the statute was not a mere technical
irregularity. It affected the substantial rights of the defendant, enabling
his conviction on a felony." 30 4 Thus, concluded the court, the evidence
from that illegal search should have been excluded.30 5
While it would be easy to conclude that a judge issuing a warrant
from the wrong county is a mere "technical irregularity" under section
2511, the court was correct in striking it down. Had the court ruled that
296. 125 P.3d 541 (Kan. 2005).
297. Id. at 546.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 546-47.
300. Id. at 548.
301. Id at 550.
302. Id. at 550-52 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2503 (1995)).
303. Id. at 551.




complete noncompliance with section 2503 was only a "technical
irregularity," it would have effectively invalidated the statute by judicial
fiat when there was no compelling reason to do so.
H. Police Interrogations
1. Custodial Interrogations
Miranda warnings are usually required when a person is in custody
and subject to interrogation.3 °6 The right to remain silent must first be
waived in order for a confession to be admissible in a court
proceeding.3°7 However, Kansas courts have maintained that some
confessions can be voluntary when made before the Miranda warnings
have been given, making them admissible. In State v. Stevens, a police
officer was investigating a possible criminal trespass when he noticed a
Jeep parked in the street. 30 8 Two people were sitting in the Jeep and the
officer saw the driver get out, stumble, and walk unsteadily toward the
residence. 30 9 The officer approached the man, the defendant Stevens,
and began to speak with him.310 Smelling alcohol, the officer asked
Stevens if he had been drinking and Stevens admitted he had.3 ' The
officer then asked why Stevens had gotten out of the driver's side of the
car, but Stevens did not respond.312 After finding alcoholic beverage
containers in the car, the officer once again told Stevens he suspected
him of driving under the influence and Stevens admitted to drinking and
driving.31 3 After refusing to complete sobriety tests, Stevens declared
"he was driving, that [Officer] Justice was going to do what he wanted,
and that to 'go ahead and get through with it. "'314 Stevens was then
arrested.315
Stevens argued on appeal-after a jury convicted him of operating or
attempting to operate under the influence of alcohol-that his statement
made to the officer should be suppressed because it was made during a
306. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434 (1984).
307. State v. Stevens, 138 P.3d 1262, 1274 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006), review granted, No. 05-94187-
AS, 2006 Kan. LEXIS 743 (Kan. Dec. 19, 2006).










custodial interrogation without a Miranda warning. 31 6  The appellate
court did not agree and decided that Stevens was not in custody when he
commented that he had been drinking and driving. 31 7 When determining
whether statements are made while a person is in custody, the court looks
at whether a "'reasonable person in the suspect's position would have
understood the situation.' 31 8 In this case, the officer was at the scene to
check on the trespass call when he noticed Stevens and began talking to
him. 319 Stevens's admission to drinking and driving was voluntary-he
had not been arrested, nor was he restrained from acting in a certain
way. 320 Therefore, Stevens was not in custody and was not subject to an
interrogation, thus his confession was allowed.321
The logic the court used to uphold the confession is flawed. The
court placed heavy emphasis on the fact that the officer was not there to
investigate a possible drunk driver, but a trespass call. This fact should
not matter. The officer obviously had the authority to arrest Stevens if he
admitted to something even when the officer was simply there to
investigate another crime. The court should have looked more into
whether Stevens felt free to leave in this situation and placed less
emphasis on why the officer was at the scene in the first place.
a. Defining Custodial Interrogations
The Kansas Court of Appeals decided another case, defining
custodial interrogation and when Miranda warnings must be read. In
State v. Woolverton,322 the defendant was arrested for making harassing
phone calls to the mother of his child.323 The mother had originally
called the defendant to ask why he had not picked up their daughter for
visitation.324 After an argument, she hung up on him.325 The defendant
began to repeatedly call her back until she finally just let her voicemail
pick up the calls. 326 The voicemails he left were angry and threatening.
316. Id. at 1267, 1274.
317. Id. at 1274.




322. 131 P.3d 1253 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006), review granted, 2006 Kan. LEXIS 704 (Kan. Nov. 8,
2006).
323. Id. at 1257.
324. Id. at 1256-57.




On one particular message, the defendant threatened to kill the mother.327
The police traveled from Johnson County, Kansas to Missouri where the
defendant lived to talk about the incident.328 The defendant asked if he
had to speak with the officers and they told him that they would return
with a warrant to take him to the police station if he did not.329 The
officers also told Woolverton that he would not be going to jail and he
was free to return to his apartment after they were done talking.330 At
this time, the defendant confessed to the threatening phone calls.
331
During the questioning, his girlfriend came out of the apartment to check
on him. 332 The interview lasted about an hour, there were no handcuffs
or weapons drawn, and Woolverton was not taken into custody after it
was over.3 33 At a later time, police arrested and charged Woolverton
with criminal threat and telephone harassment.334
The defendant argued that this encounter was a custodial
interrogation and that he was never Mirandized.335 The trial court found
that the defendant was not in custody when the statements were made,
and, therefore, admitted the statements into evidence.336 In his appeal,
Woolverton argued he was under custodial interrogation because a
reasonable person would not have felt free to leave in the same
circumstances.337 The court looked to many factors to determine whether
Woolverton was under custodial interrogation: when and where the
interrogation occurred, the length of time of the interrogation, how many
officers were present, whether he was being questioned as a suspect or a
witness, what each person said during the encounter, whether there was
actual restraint or something comparable to restraint, how he got to the
place of questioning, and the events that happened after the interrogation
(i.e. if the person was free to leave or was taken to jail).338 The appellate
court affirmed that Woolverton was not in custody. 339 The interview
location was chosen by the defendant, there were no handcuffs, and other
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1262.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 1263.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 1257.
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people like the defendant's girlfriend could come check on him.340
Further, he was also allowed to return to his apartment after the
interview. 341 While the officers did tell him that he could either speak
with them then or they would get a search warrant, this indicated to
Woolverton that he had a choice to talk to the officers or not.342 The
defendant was not in custody, and, therefore, did not need Miranda
warnings.
b. Invocation of Right to Remain Silent
In United States v. Nelson,343 the court decided that statements made
after Miranda warnings, but before the defendant actually invoked his
right to silence, would be allowed to be used in trial.344 In Nelson, the
police arrested the defendant, Mr. Nelson, served a search warrant,
searched his apartment, and returned to the police station.345  At this
point Nelson was read his Miranda warnings and asked if he would sign
a waiver of rights.346 The defendant changed the subject, asking instead
about the search of his apartment.347  The detective responded by
presenting a list of drugs found in the apartment to Nelson. 348 He replied
with "'I guess I'm ready to go to jail then."'
349
The defendant challenged this statement as a product of a custodial
interrogation. 350  The district court denied this argument because the
statement was not a direct response to any question put forth by a police
officer, thus there was no interrogation. 35 1 The defendant asserted that a
conversation can be an interrogation even without direct questioning if
the police use other words or actions they "'know are reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.' ' 352  The Tenth
Circuit did not agree with this argument based on the facts presented.353




343. 450 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 326 (2006).
344. Id. at 1211-12.




349. Id (emphasis omitted).
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 1211 (quoting United States v. Rambo, 365 F.3d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 2004)).
353. See id. (finding this case distinguishable from Rambo).
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rights, but rather asked another question about his apartment.354 After
the defendant had made his statement, the officer quickly ended the
conversation. 355  The Miranda warnings had been given before the
statement was made, but Nelson had never invoked his right to silence.
356
Therefore, even if this had been a custodial interrogation, the officers
still did not violate Miranda.357 While Nelson tried to avoid this by
saying the statement itself was an invocation of his right to silence, the
court decided that the statement was too ambiguous for a reasonable
police officer to understand that it was meant to be an invocation of the
right to remain silent.358
While this particular case was decided correctly based on the facts,
the decision could lead to a slippery slope of admitting statements after
Miranda warnings are given, but before a waiver of the right to remain
silent has been obtained. The right to remain silent should be an absolute
right that can only be waived by the person in custody. If courts allow
statements to become admissible when the person in custody has not
actually waived his or her rights, this could lead to a Miranda-loophole
increasingly used by officers. Officers who know this loophole may
soon find ways to get incriminating statements to become admissible
without actually asking direct questions. This technique could be
dangerous and is contrary to the primary purpose of the right to remain
silent-to protect people in custody.
2. Interpreters
Kansas courts upheld the decision that an interpreter is not
automatically required during an interrogation if English is not the
primary language of the person in custody. A totality of the
circumstances test is used instead. In State v. Pham,359 the defendant was
arrested for breaking into a family's home, tying up the family members,
stealing jewelry, and fatally shooting one of the family members.36 °
Pham was arrested and asked if he needed an interpreter. He replied he





358. Id. at 1211-12.
359. 136 P.3d 919 (Kan. 2006).
360. Id. at 927-28.
361. Id. at 927.
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Pham read them off a card.362 The defendant argued on appeal that not
providing him an interpreter was a violation of chapter 75, section
435 1(e) of the Kansas Statutes.363 The statute declares that an interpreter
should be given to a person who is about to be interrogated and English
is not his or her primary language. 364 It also states that "'the trial court
must still determine whether an in-custody statement was freely,
voluntarily and knowingly given, with knowledge of the Miranda
rights.' '' 365 Having an interpreter does not automatically guarantee the
admissibility of a confession and the totality of circumstances test must
still be used.366 Here, Pham's interrogation had been videotaped.367 The
district court held that there was no evidence of a significant amount of
misunderstanding. 368 Pham had lived in America for more than twenty
years and the totality of circumstances indicated that an interpreter was
not needed and that the confession was made knowingly and
voluntarily.
369
3. Confessions Following an Arrest Without Probable Cause
The Kansas Supreme Court decided that it is possible for an arrest
without probable cause to so taint a confession from an interrogation that
the confession is inadmissible even if the person being interrogated had
been Mirandized. In State v. Hill,370 the defendant, Hill, was arrested on
a drug charge and read his Miranda rights. 371 After the warnings, the
defendant admitted in a subsequent interrogation that he had used
methamphetamines during a particular time period.372  The arrest,
however, was thrown out for lack of probable cause.373 Therefore, the
question was whether, since the arrest was not valid, the subsequent
confessions and statements should also be excluded. The court laid out
four factors to consider when determining this issue: whether the
Miranda warnings were given, the immediacy of the arrest and the
362. Id.
363. Id. at 930.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 931 (quoting State v. Zuniga, 703 P.3d 805, 808 (Kan. 1985)) (emphasis omitted).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 931-32.
369. Id. at 932.
370. 130 P.3d I (Kan. 2006).
371. Id. at 5.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 12.
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subsequent statements, the flagrancy of the wrongdoing of the officers,
and any other circumstances that should be taken into account on a case-
by-case basis.
374
The court applied the four-factor test to the facts and held the
defendant's statements should be suppressed. First, nine hours elapsed
between the arrest and the interrogation when Hill was not free to
leave.3 75 There were also no intervening events to separate the unlawful
arrest and the interrogation.376 The only event in between was a search
of the apartment where the defendant had allegedly manufactured
methamphetamine.377  Therefore, the unlawful arrest and the
interrogation directly related to each other.378 The only factor that
favored allowing the statements in were that the defendant was
Mirandized.379 This one factor, however, was not enough. The Kansas
Supreme Court decided that when there is no intervening event to
separate the unlawful arrest and the statements made during an
interrogation, the statements are inadmissible.38 °
4. Duties of Police Officers During Interrogations
a. Obligation to Protect Suspect from Making a Statement
A police officer is under no obligation to stop or protect a suspect
from making an incriminating statement. In State v. Sykes,38 ' an officer
had been driving around a neighborhood when he noticed the defendant
waving at another car to pull over.382 The officer observed the defendant
Sykes approach the car and extend his hand to the driver. 383 In his hand,
there appeared to be a plastic bag with off-white rocks in it. 384 Another
officer approached, asked if he could pat the defendant down, and then
decided to search his pockets.385 In the pockets, there were plastic bags
374. Id. at 13.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 14.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 13.
380. Id. at 14.
381. 132 P.3d 485 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006), review denied, No. 05-94075-A, 2006 Kan. LEXIS 504
(Kan. Sept. 19, 2006).






which contained what appeared to be crack cocaine.386 Sykes was placed
under arrest.3 87 As the officers were about to carry out a field test on the
rocks, Sykes motioned to the officer and told the officer that "the rocks
would test positive as cocaine and ... he had planned to sell the cocaine
to make some money because he was out of work. 3 88 Sykes was given
his Miranda warnings after making these statements.389
The defendant tried to suppress the statements made before the
39 391Miranda warnings. 0 The district court denied this motion. Sykes
argued on appeal that the officer had a duty to read Miranda directly
after Sykes told him the rocks would test positive for cocaine and before
confessing an intent to sell the cocaine.392 The Kansas Court of Appeals
noted the police were not allowed to say or do anything that they
reasonably knew would likely extract a damaging statement.3 93 Here,
though, the officer did not try to elicit any information, and it was Sykes
who called the officer over to talk.394 The court of appeals decided that
"[a] suspect's privilege against self-incrimination does not impose a duty
upon police officers to prevent the suspect from making incriminating
statements. '" 395 The court further discussed that the Miranda warnings
were enforced in order to prevent coercive methods for interrogation.
396
The police officer in this case was not required to interrupt the defendant
with Miranda warnings before he made further voluntary statements.397
b. Fairness of Officer Tactics
The Kansas Supreme Court also ruled on a case significant to the
fairness of police tactics during interrogation. In State v. Ackward,398 the
defendant was arrested for felony murder.399 The defendant argued that





390. Id. at 496.
391. Id.
392. Id.





398. 128 P.3d 382 (Kan. 2006).
399. Id. at 385.
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grounds. 400 The test to decide this issue of voluntariness is the totality of
circumstances.4
First, the defendant argued that the duration of the interrogation was
long and led to his statements not being voluntary.40 2 He claimed that the
interrogation lasted around nine hours.40 3  The court decided the
extended nature of the interrogation did not infringe on the defendant's
rights because he was given numerous breaks.404 The court also noted
that the defendant could not be successful in arguing that he felt isolated
from the outside world, because he was able to have his cell phone on
during the questioning.40 5 Finally, the court did not find persuasive
defendant's argument that he was coerced based on his age or intellect.
He was twenty years old at the time of the questioning and could
communicate with the police about the matter; thus the court held there
was no coercion, and the statements were voluntary.40 6
The court next addressed whether the officers handled the
interrogation fairly.40 7 The defendant made many arguments contending
that they did not. First, the defendant claimed that the police officers
gave him false information to coerce a confession, such as telling him
there were eyewitnesses who saw him at the location of the shooting, that
there was a police report showing that the defendant always carried a
gun, and that his hands would be swabbed to check for gun residue,
which would inform the police whether he had shot a gun in the past
forty-eight hours.40 8 The Kansas Supreme Court noted previous cases
holding that false information alone was not fatal to confessions, and that
there must be other factors present for the statements to be involuntary.40 9
The next fairness issue involved the religious references that the
police made to the defendant. 410  The police officers engaged in a
religious discussion with the defendant about the afterlife.4 11 The court
stated that the defendant was not so immature that he could not handle
400. Id. at 387.
401. Id.












the religious discussions.4' 2 The religious references continued even
after the defendant had asked for an attorney, but statements made during
this portion of the questioning were already suppressed by the trial
court.41 3 Regarding the admissible statements, the court, in considering
the age of the defendant, decided that religious references alone could
not be considered fatal to the statements.4 14
Finally, the defendant argued the officers lied about the law in two
ways. 4 15 First, he claimed they lied about the benefits for the defendant
if he confessed."'6 The officers indicated that if the defendant confessed,
he would receive more lenient treatment. 4' 7 The defendant cited cases in
which the courts had decided that confessions were not voluntary if they
were coerced through hope or false benefit."' 8  The Kansas Supreme
Court, however, cited a case in which the officers told a defendant that
his lack of cooperation would work to his detriment. 4 9 Even in that
circumstance, the court said the officer's statement does not make "the
confession involuntary per se.,"420 Therefore, the statement here was not
coerced by false benefit.42' The second alleged misrepresentation of the
law was that the officer stated that the defendant would be better off if
the shooting had occurred in certain ways.42 2 During interrogation the
police officer began distinguishing to the defendant the difference
between first-degree murder and reckless homicide, and the difference in
punishments between the two.423 The court recognized that this probably
was misleading. 2" The officer indicated that the homicide might have
been a case of self-defense, but that defense would not apply in this case,
because the victim was shot in the back. 25 The intent of the officer was
to make the defendant think this defense applied to him. 426 The court,
however, still decided that the statements by the officer were more
412. Id. at 390.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 390-91.
416. Id. at 390.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 390-91.
420. Id. at 391.
421. Id. at 392.
422. ld. at 391.
423. Id.
424. Id.




427exaggeration than false statements. The court also noted that if the
defendant had been a law enforcement official, the defense would have
applied to him.428 Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, the
statements were found to be voluntary and admissible in court.4 29
The Kansas Supreme Court in Ackward did not correctly apply the
totality of the circumstances test. The court stated that the trial court:
found Ackward was mature, did not appear to be under stress, and was
not swayed by religious references or misstatements of law or fact. The
religious references were subtle, and the mistakes in fact and law were
not egregious, and in some cases they were more an exaggeration rather
than false .... There was no evidence that Ackward had a low IQ or
below normal intelligence.
4 30
This analysis by the court, though, does not add up. Earlier in the
opinion, the court discussed how certain factors alone did not make the
statements coerced or unfair. It appears, though, that there were many
different factors in the analysis that, while they alone would not have
made the statements fatal, under the totality of circumstances, these
factors should have caused the statements to be suppressed.
First, the court glazed over the issue that the officer misrepresented
the defenses that the defendant could use. As a result, the defendant
probably thought that self-defense could apply to him, when in actuality
the defense would not have applied to this defendant. The court even
admits this was a misrepresentation, but the court leaves it at that and just
reiterates the totality of circumstances test without much more
consideration to this factor.431
The main argument, though, is that the defendant's statements were
likely coerced by other factors. When combined, these factors indicate
that the statements should have been suppressed. The court misanalyzed
the misrepresentation resulting from the promising of benefits to the
defendant. The defendant here could have argued that his statement was
directly influenced by the hope of benefiting from confessing, coupled
with the false information offered by the police, which probably led him
to fear that the police had more information than they did. This
reasoning is arguably coercive. Without the false information and the








therefore coerced. By arguing this factor along with the false
information that the officers provided, the confession should not have
been admitted.
L Witness Psychological Examination
Recently, the Kansas Supreme Court, for the first time, decided a
case involving a psychological examination of a noncomplaining
witness.432 Under Kansas law, trial courts have discretion to decide
whether to require a witness to undergo psychological examination.433 In
State v. Cook, the defendant contended that by refusing to order the
State's key witness to submit to a psychological examination, the trial
court denied him his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness
testifying against him.4 34 The Kansas Supreme Court used an abuse of
discretion standard, similar to the standard used by other jurisdictions
faced with this same issue, to evaluate the trial court's decision to forego
psychological examination of a noncomplaining witness.435
The trial court cited a previous Kansas Supreme Court decision,
State v. Gregg,436  as precedent for not requiring Rudell, the
noncomplaining witness, to undergo a psychological examination.437 In
Gregg, the court denied the defendant's motion for a court-ordered
psychological examination of an eight-year-old child victim.
438
Although agreeing that a trial court could "order a psychiatric
examination of the complaining witness ... if the defendant presents a
compelling reason for such an examination, ' 439 the court refused to
require the child to undergo psychological examination because Gregg
failed to provide a specific reason why the child should be examined
(such as a history of mental instability or previously filing false
charges). 440 Thus, the court concluded that requiring her to undergo a
psychological examination would have amounted to "a fishing
expedition embarked upon in the hope something damaging and
admissible in the trial would be unearthed."44'
432. State v. Cook, 135 P.3d 1147, 1161 (Kan. 2006).
433. Id. (citing State v. Price, 61 P.3d 676 (Kan. 2003)).
434. Id.
435. Id. (citing State v. Calliham, 57 P.3d 220, 225 (Utah 2002)).
436. 602 P.2d 85 (Kan. 1979).
437. Cook, 135 P.3d at 1161 (citing Gregg).
438. Gregg, 602 P.2d at 92.
439. Id. at 91.




The defendant, Cook, also cited Gregg, arguing that his request was
not a "fishing expedition" because of Rudell's history: drug abuse,
depression, and the report from a psychologist who had "diagnosed him
with a schizoaffective disorder ... [stating he] experienced disorganized
thinking, auditory hallucinations, agitation, and suicidal ideations. ' '442 In
reaching its decision, the Kansas Supreme Court emphasized both that
Rudell's history of mental instability was over ten years old and was the
subject of cross-examination, and that Cook failed to provide any
authority that these issues created "compelling reasons why the witness
should have been required to submit to psychological testing prior to
testifying., 443 Thus, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Cook's motion to subject Rudell to a
psychological examination.444
The Kansas Supreme Court correctly refused to overturn the trial
court's decision to forego a psychological examination of Rudell for
several reasons. First, given the nature of the crime involved-second-
degree murder445-and Rudell's intimate involvement in its
commission-he was at the scene when the victim was shot and helped
hide evidence of the crime 446 -it seems unlikely that a psychological
examination would be necessary to establish Rudell's mental instability
at the time of the murder. Second, it is unlikely that a psychological
examination would have resulted in additional admissible evidence.
Furthermore, the court allowed the defendant's counsel to engage in
extensive cross-examination of Rudell and his psychiatrist at the time he
was hospitalized on matters that included his history of mental instability
and the effect it had on his ability to recall the sequence of events on the
day of the murder.447 Given that the jury was fully informed of Rudell's
history of drug abuse and mental instability, it is difficult to imagine
what could have been gained by requiring Rudell to undergo a formal
psychological examination.
442. Cook, 135 P.2d at 1161.
443. Id. at 1163.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 1149.
446. Id. at 1151.
447. Id. at 1163.
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J. Right to Counsel
1. Right to Counsel of Choice
Within the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel
dwells the right to choose one's own counsel when counsel is not court
appointed.448  In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the United States
Supreme Court considered first, whether a defendant must show actual
prejudice when his right to counsel of choice is violated,449 and second,
whether he must show that the violation resulted in more than "harmless
error."450 Distinguishing the violation of a defendant's right to counsel
of choice from ineffective assistance of counsel,451 the Supreme Court
held that a criminal defendant does not have to show actual prejudice to
his case to establish that his or her right to counsel of choice has been
violated because a violation occurs "whenever the defendant's choice [of
counsel] is wrongfully denied.,
452
The Court then continued its analysis by differentiating between trial
error (error occurring in the courtroom before the jury) and structural
error.453  Reasoning that different attorneys would "pursue different
strategies [in] investigation and discovery, [developing a] defense,
[selecting a] jury, . . . and style of witness examination and jury
argument,' 454 the Court considered a denial of the right to counsel of
choice a structural error.455 Because it involves more than just "'error in
the trial process,"' the Court held that structural error "'def[ies] analysis
by harmless-error standards. ' 'A56  Thus, the Court held that when a
defendant is denied access to unappointed counsel of his choice, the
defendant is not required to show prejudice or to engage in "harmless-
error analysis" to have his or her conviction overturned.45 7
Although the majority's decision seems plausible, it goes too far in
allowing absolute reversal any time a court denies the accused access to
counsel of his choice. Not only does it appear incredibly extreme,
448. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2561 (2006) (citing Wheat v. United
States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)).
449. Id. at 2561-66.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 2562-64.
452. Id. at 2565.
453. Id. at 2563-64.
454. Id. at 2564.
455. Id.
456. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991)).
457. Id. at 2566.
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especially in situations involving an error of judgment on the part of the
court, but it also allows those fortunate enough to be able to afford
counsel an "out" unavailable to those who require appointed counsel.
Obviously, the United States Supreme Court cannot create a "right to
counsel of choice" for indigent defendants who require appointed
counsel. However, given that an absolute right to counsel of one's
choice does not exist for all defendants, insisting upon absolute reversal
as a remedy for a constitutional violation against a "special class" of
defendant seems (at the very least) overreaching.
2. Right to Appointment of New Counsel
When reviewing the trial court's decision not to grant the
defendant's pro se motion for appointment of new counsel in State v.
McGee,458 the Kansas Supreme Court applied an abuse of discretion
standard based upon whether a reasonable person would consider the
decision "arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable., 459  Agreeing that a
defendant has the right to appointment of new counsel when he can show
"a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict, or a complete
breakdown in communication[] between" attorney and client,46° the court
nevertheless determined that it was within the discretion of the trial court
to decide whether such a conflict existed based on the evidence before
it.461 Finding that the parties' disagreement about the amount of time and
effort that should be put into preparing for the defendant's trial did not
qualify as a conflict of interest, the court affirmed the defendant's
462conviction.
However, when presented with more convincing evidence that a
conflict of interest existed between the defendant charged with a felony
and his court-appointed counsel, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the
trial court had a duty to investigate.463 In State v. Vann, the defendant
not only filed a pro se motion to dismiss his court-appointed attorney, but
also wrote a letter to the court inquiring about his pro se motion, filed
another motion to proceed pro se, and continued to insist that he and his
458. 126 P.3d 1110 (Kan. 2006).
459. Id. at 1113 (citing State v. Jasper, 8 P.3d 708, 711 (Kan. 2000)).
460. Id. (citing Jasper, 8 P.3d at 711).
461. Id. at 1114.
462. Id. at 1114-15.




attorney had conflicting interests. 464 The Kansas Supreme Court held
that there was a clear duty to investigate the alleged conflict of interest
and, therefore, remanded the case to the trial court for further
investigation into the alleged conflict of interest.
465
Appointing counsel for indigent criminal defendants has become an
essential component of the criminal justice system. Even though courts
seek to provide indigent defendants with competent counsel to afford all
criminal defendants with a fair trial, appointment of suitable counsel can
present quite a challenge. Still, if courts were to provide newly
appointed counsel to every criminal defendant that felt he or she was not
receiving the level of legal representation to which he or she was
entitled, the criminal justice system would grind to a halt. Such a system
would encourage crafty defendants to engage in delay tactics by
requesting new counsel at every turn. Even so, the court has a duty to
protect criminal defendants from bad counsel or counsel with conflicting
interests. The court's approach correctly attempts to consider the
possibility that appointed counsel will not provide the level of
representation that the defendant deserves while at the same time
protecting the criminal justice system from abuse by criminal defendants.
3. Right to Proceed Pro Se
A criminal defendant has the right to represent himself if, prior to
trial, he or she makes "'a knowing and intelligent waiver of [his or her]
right to counsel [after being] informed on the record of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation [so that] the choice is ... made with
eyes open."' '466 Failure to assert the right to proceed pro se constitutes
waiver,467 and courts are to make "'every reasonable presumption against
waiver' of the right to counsel. ' ' 68 Also, courts can require "standby
counsel" to aid in the defendant's self-representation regardless of
protest by the defendant.469 However, if the court chooses to deny the
accused his right to pro se representation, the defendant will
automatically be entitled to a new trial.47 °
464. Id. at 315.
465. Id.
466. Id. at 315-16 (quoting State v. Graham, 46 P.3d 1177, 1182 (Kan. 2002)).
467. Id. at 316.
468. Id. (quoting State v. Lowe, 847 P.2d 1334, 1338 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993)).
469. Id. at 315 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975)).
470. Id. at 316-17.
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In State v. Vann, the court was faced with determining whether
Vann's actions constituted waiver of his right to counsel. 471 Finding that
the standard adopted by the Kansas Court of Appeals would erroneously
require a defendant to "continually reassert" his desire to proceed pro se
or risk waiving his right to self-representation,472 the Kansas Supreme
Court considered Vann's motion to proceed pro se with his appointed
counsel as an advisor to be "a clear and unequivocal assertion of the right
to proceed pro se."4 7 3 Even though Vann's motion to proceed pro se was
joined by motions for new counsel, the court still held that his actions
evidenced his desire to proceed pro se and thus the trial court had the
duty to at least "conduct . . . further inquiry into the defendant's
position., 474  Thus, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed Vann's
conviction and ordered a new trial.475
Given Vann's persistence in attempting to proceed pro se, one can
hardly disagree that the trial court had an obligation to determine
whether Vann was attempting to waive his right to counsel. By ignoring
the defendant's motions, the trial court caused Vann to believe that he no
longer had the right to represent himself. Because criminal defendants
are often unfamiliar with the details of courtroom procedure, courts
should have an obligation to inform defendants of their constitutional
rights, especially when the court has been made aware that the defendant
wishes to assert his or her rights. No court should be allowed to use the
unfamiliar details of courtroom procedure to confuse a defendant into
believing he or she has waived his or her constitutional rights, especially
when the defendant makes an obvious attempt to assert those rights.
4. Right to Counsel in Probation Revocation Hearing
The United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court, does not require states to provide counsel for defendants
476involved in probation hearings. However, under Kansas law criminal
defendants involved in probation hearings have a statutory right to
counsel.47 7 Because a defendant could potentially use his or her right to





476. State v. Young, 128 P.3d 1004, 1007 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 790 (1973)).




counsel to permanently halt the probationary hearing process by refusing
to appoint counsel or by continually changing counsel,47 8 the defendant
must either accept the representation of a court-appointed attorney or
appear at the scheduled hearing with counsel of his or her choice.479 If a
defendant appears at his or her probationary hearing without counsel, the
court must then appoint counsel and reschedule the hearing to allow the
480defendant's newly appointed counsel time to prepare.
In State v. Young, the defendant sought to overturn the trial court's
decision to revoke his probation.481 Young argued that his statutory right
to counsel during a probation hearing was violated when the trial court
denied a continuance of his probationary hearing even though Young
was without counsel.482 The trial court attempted to justify its decision to
proceed with the hearing by accusing Young of engaging in stalling
tactics because he continually failed to acquire counsel.483 The Kansas
Court of Appeals, while agreeing that the trial court had the right and the
obligation to "protect itself' from abusive stalling tactics, 484 found it
necessary to overturn the trial court's decision. Relying on Kansas
Supreme Court precedent, it maintained that the proper remedy for the
situation was appointment of counsel and a continuation of the hearing to
allow the defendant's newly appointed counsel sufficient time to
prepare.48 5
K. Effective Assistance of Counsel
A criminal defendant bringing an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim must show both: (1) that his or her "counsel's performance was
deficient, meaning counsel made errors so serious that his or her
performance was less than that guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment";
and (2) that his or her counsel's poor performance "prejudiced the
defense, which requires a showing that counsel's errors deprived the
478. See. e.g., id at 1005-07 (exemplifying stalling tactics used to prolong the process of
revoking defendant's probation).
479. Id. at 1008.
480. Id. at 1009.
481. See id. at 1006 (outlining the defendant's motions on appeal).
482. Id. at 1007.
483. See id. at 1105-07 (detailing the course of events that transpired between the time Young
was ordered to appear for a probationary hearing until the court's decision to require Young to
proceed with the hearing absent counsel).
484. Id. at 1008.
485. Id. at 1007-08.
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defendant of a fair trial. 4 86 A presumption that counsel was effective
exists, which puts the burden of proving that counsel was ineffective on
the defendant.487 Although a presumption of effectiveness exists, failure
to obtain facts or to interview witnesses regarding potential exculpatory
information may provide sufficient support for finding that a defendant's
counsel was ineffective.488 In Swenson v. State, the defendant located a
witness willing to testify that the victim had confessed to him that
Swenson was not the individual responsible for shooting him.489 In his
motion for reversal due to ineffective counsel, the defendant contended
that his attorney's argument that he chose not to call Swenson's witness
as a matter of trial strategy was not persuasive because he had a duty to
at least interview the witness.490 The Kansas Court of Appeals ordered
an evidentiary hearing on whether Swenson's attorney should have
further investigated the witness.49'
Swenson also alleged that the prosecutor's amended complaint was
"defective because it failed to include the element of premeditation.
' 492
He contended that his attorney should have challenged the complaint and
his failure to do so provides further evidence that his counsel was
ineffective.493 When faced with an ineffective assistance of counsel
motion, the court must evaluate a decision by counsel not to "file a
motion to dismiss or to vacate the judgment that alleged a defective
information or complaint [under] the common-sense rule. 494 Although
the complaint clearly omitted any mention of premeditation, the court
reasoned, based on Swenson's attorney's closing arguments, that the
defense was aware of the requirement that the prosecutor show
premeditation.495  Thus, the court determined that although the State
failed to include premeditation as a necessary element in its complaint,
the defense was not prejudiced by the State's omission.49 6
486. Swenson v. State, 135 P.3d 157, 164 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v. Davis, 85 P.3d
1164, 1169 (Kan. 2004)), review granted, No. 05-94207-AS, 2006 Kan. LEXIS 484 (Kan. Sept. 19,
2006).
487. Id. at 165 (citing State v. Betts, 33 P.3d 575, 590-91 (Kan. 2001)).
488. Id. at 166.
489. Id. at 165-66.
490. Id. at 165 (citing Mullins v. State, 46 P.3d 1222, 1225-26 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002)).
491. Id. at 166.
492. Id. at 167.
493. Id.







The State may amend its complaint against a defendant any time
after filing the complaint so long as no verdict has been rendered if the
"'rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.' ' 497  Also, a defendant
"'may be charged with one offense and bound over for another"' if on
"'preliminary examination,"' it appears "'he is guilty of [both]
offense[s].' 498 A prosecutor choosing to file a pretrial amendment to a
complaint against a defendant has traditionally been given "considerable
latitude" by Kansas courts.4 9 9 Once the court allows an amended
complaint, its decision cannot be overturned unless the defendant can
show that the trial court abused its discretion by adopting a view that "no
reasonable person would take.,
500
In State v. Bischoff the State began by bringing charges against
Bischoff for criminal threat. 50 1 Less than two weeks after the preliminary
hearing the State sought to amend the complaint by adding a felony
charge of aggravated assault; 50 2 the State's motion was later granted by
the trial court.50 3 Nearly two months later, Bischoff sought to dismiss the
amended complaint, or at the very least, request a bill of particulars;
50 4
the trial court denied Bischoff's motions. 505 On appeal, the Kansas Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision.50 6 The State subsequently
appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court.
In its decision, the Kansas Supreme Court considered whether
Bischoff's rights were actually prejudiced by the trial court's decision to
allow the amendment. The court noted that Bischoff never presented any
evidence of prejudice at his hearing before the trial court or in his
arguments before the court of appeals, 50 7 and that he had a ten-month
497. State v. Bischoff, 131 P.3d 531, 538 (Kan. 2006) (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3201(e)
(Supp. 2004)).
498. Id. at 539 (quoting State v. Pioletti, 785 P.2d 963, 972 (Kan. 2003)).
499. Id. at 538.
500. Id.
501. Id. at 534.
502. Id.




507. Id. at 539.
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period of time between the amendment and the trial. 508  The court
reasoned that Bischoff, given the amount of time between the
amendment and the trial, was not prejudiced by the amended complaint
and reversed the court of appeals's decision. °9
The court also reasoned that Bischoff was not prejudiced by the
State's amended complaint because he had plenty of opportunity at the
preliminary hearing, held prior to the State's filing of a motion to amend
the complaint, to cross-examine witnesses about the added charge of
aggravated assault. However, without knowing, or having reason to
expect, that the prosecutor intended to charge him with that offense,
Bischoff had no reason to pursue that line of questioning in cross-
examination of the State's witnesses. Therefore, to argue that he was not
prejudiced because he had ample opportunity to cross-examine the same
witnesses at the preliminary hearing as later testified at trial is a gross
oversimplification that ignores the fact that to take full advantage of an
opportunity to interview witnesses, the accused must first know all the
charges against him.
B. Bail
Bail bonds are treated as contracts between bondsmen and the state
and require bondsmen to guarantee that a criminal defendant will meet
the conditions of his or her bond as ordered by the court.510 However, if
by altering the terms of a defendant's bond, the court materially changes
the bondsman's liability, the bondsman is released from his obligation to
the state.511 Kansas courts have defined "material change ... as 'a
change that a careful and prudent person would regard as substantially
increasing the risk of loss.'
512
In State v. Sedam, the Kansas Court of Appeals held that by
significantly increasing the conditions of the defendant's bond (i.e.,
requiring the defendant charged with possession of a controlled
substance to submit to a urinalysis and appear before the court on a
weekly basis), the court materially changed the defendant's bond.51 3 The
508. Id.
509. Id. at 540.
510. State v. Sedam, 122 P.3d 829, 831 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Indemnity Ins. Co.,
672 P.2d 251, 253-54 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983)), review denied, No. 04-92737-A, 2006 Kan. LEXIS 76
(Kan. Feb. 15, 2006).
511. Id. (citing First Nat'l Bank of Anthony v. Dunning, 855 P.2d 493, 495-96 (Kan. Ct. App.
1993)).
512. Id. (quoting First Nat 'l Bank ofAnthony, 855 P.2d at 496).
513. Id. at 831.
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State contended that the bondsman was still liable for the bond,
regardless of the fact that the court materially changed the bond without
his approval, because Sedam's violation related to the conditions of the
original bond. 51 4 The Kansas Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that
by failing to notify the bondsman of material changes in the conditions of
the defendant's bond, the court effectively nullified the bondsman's
contract with the state. 
5 15
Courts should not have the authority to make significant changes
binding a bondsman without first allowing him to determine whether he
finds the increased risk acceptable. Clearly, the Kansas Court of Appeals
agrees as it appears to have absolved the bondsman of his obligation to
the state not only because doing so seems "fair," but also as a means of
doling out a kind of punishment for failing to communicate with the
defendant's bondsman. Hopefully, the court's decision will lead to an
increase in communication between courts and bondsmen.
C. Preliminary Hearing
The procedures following the arrest of a criminal defendant are
initially governed by chapter 22, sections 2901 and 2902 of the Kansas
Statutes.51 6 Section 2901(1) states that if arrested on probable cause, a
criminal defendant "shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the
nearest available magistrate and a complaint shall be filed forthwith.,
517
Unreasonable delay in holding the initial appearance may result in
dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.5 18 However, the Kansas
Supreme Court has continually noted that this form of sanction "should
be imposed only under extremely compelling circumstances ...where
no other remedy would protect against abuse. 519
Amendments to section 2902(1) allow the State to request a
preliminary examination before a magistrate.52 °  Prior to the
amendments, the right to request a preliminary examination was given
514. See id. at 830 ("The State argues that reinstatement of Sedam's bond did not prejudice
Warfield in any way and Sedam's bond was revoked for failing to appear, which was the
fundamental obligation of the bond.").
515. Id.at831.
516. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2901 to -2902 (Supp. 2006).
517. Id. § 22-2901(1).
518. See State v. Crouch, 641 P.2d 394, 396 (Kan. 1982) (addressing the issue of "whether the
incarceration of the defendants for eleven days ... warranted the dismissal with prejudice").
519. Id. at 398; see also State v. Rivera, 83 P.3d 169, 177 (Kan. 2004) (citing Crouch for the
contention that dismissal "must be exercised with great caution and only in cases where no other
remedy would protect against the State's abuse").
520. 2006 Kan. Sess. Laws 247.
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only to the criminal defendant.52' As a result, a defendant could waive
their right to the hearing without objection from the State.522 The
amendments also remove references to felony "warrants," replacing them
with the term, "charge., 523 The amended version of section 2902 states
that "[t]he state and every person charged with a felony shall have a right
to a preliminary examination before a magistrate, unless such charge has
been issued as a result of an indictment by a grand jury. 524 Therefore,
the State may now request a preliminary examination even when such a
hearing has been waived by the criminal defendant.
It does not appear that this ability to request a preliminary hearing
against the wishes of the criminal defendant will have a very significant
impact on criminal procedure. When a defendant has waived the
preliminary hearing, he or she is to be bound over for trial in the court
having jurisdiction.525 It is likely that the State will rarely have the desire
to request a preliminary hearing in such an instance. Exceptions will
occur, however, such as to provide witnesses an opportunity to gain
experience testifying prior to trial.
D. The Formal Charge: Information and Indictment
Section 3201(b) requires that "[t]he complaint, information or
indictment ... be a plain and concise written statement of the essential
facts constituting the crime charged., 526 Amendments to the information
or complaint are allowed pursuant to section 3201(e), which states that
"[t]he court may permit a complaint or information to be amended at any
time before verdict or finding if no additional or different crime is
charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. 527
In State v. Bischoff, the Kansas Supreme Court recognized that it has
previously interpreted this statute as allowing the charging of a different
crime by amendment to the complaint before trial "provided [that] the
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.,, 528 "Whether to
allow the amendment is subject to the district court's discretion.,
529
521. See id. (adding the State's right to that of the person charged).
522. See id. (allowing a defendant the right to waive preliminary examination).
523. Id.
524. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2902(1) (Supp. 2006).
525. Id. § 22-2902(4).
526. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3201(b) (Supp. 2006).
527. Id. § 22-3201(e).





Furthermore, the court stated that it has "consistently. . . given the State
considerable latitude in amending a complaint prior to trial., 530 An abuse
of discretion will be found "only when no reasonable person would take
the view adopted by the district court.",531 Lastly, the criminal "defendant
bears the burden of establishing such an abuse of discretion.
532
In the event of a complaint, information, or indictment that fails to
sufficiently inform the defendant of the particulars of the crime thereby
preventing the preparation of a defense, "the court may, on written
motion of the defendant," require the prosecutor to provide a bill of
particulars. 533 "A bill of particulars serves to inform the defendant of the
nature of the charges and the evidence against him or her, enabling the
defendant to prepare a defense, and to prevent further prosecution for the
same offense. 534  The decision requiring a bill of particulars is
discretionary with the court "except in such cases where the charging
instrument itself is insufficient to inform the accused of the charges
against which he or she must defend., 535 The defendant bears the burden
of establishing an abuse of the court's discretion in denying a bill of
particulars.536 However, "[t]here is no abuse of discretion in denying the
bill of particulars where the record is clear the defendant was not
misled.
5 37
E. Jurisdiction and Venue
In State v. Johnson, the defendant challenged the court's jurisdiction
to convict and sentence him under a lesser offense than that charged.538
Johnson was originally charged with aggravated indecent liberties with a
child.53 9 "At trial the State proposed a lesser included instruction on
aggravated indecent solicitation of a child... but never filed an amended
complaint . ... 540 "If a crime is not specifically stated in the




533. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3201(0 (Supp. 2006).
534. Bischoff 131 P.3d at 539 (citing State v. Myatt, 697 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1985)).
535. Id. at 540 (citing State v. Webber, 918 P.2d 609, 625 (Kan. 1996)).
536. Id.
537. Id. (citing State v. Kee, 711 P.2d 746, 756 (Kan. 1985)).
538. State v. Johnson, 122 P.3d 397, 400 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005), review granted, No. 04-91867-





district court lacks jurisdiction to convict the defendant of the crime,
regardless of the evidence presented. '54' Due to lack of evidence, the
charge listed in Johnson's complaint was one for which he could not be
convicted, thus creating a situation of legal impossibility. 542 The Kansas
Court of Appeals determined that the lesser offense, aggravated indecent
solicitation of a child, satisfied the "elements test" because each element
of the lesser charge applicable to the defendant was also included in the
principal charge.543 Furthermore, the court concluded that "[t]he mere
fact that the evidence was arguably insufficient to support a conviction
under [the principal offense] does not affect the jurisdiction of the court
to impose a sentence for a conviction under a proper lesser included
offense." 54  Notably, this holding is not likely affected by the Kansas
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Schoonover.545 In Schoonover, the
court discussed double jeopardy in the context of multiple charges for the
same offense rather than a single, lesser charge.546
In State v. Elliott, the defendant challenged his criminal history
classification for purposes of felony sentence enhancement. 547 "In June
2003, Elliott was charged in the district court with [felony] driving under
the influence of alcohol with two or more prior DUI convictions in
violation of [section] 8-1567.,,548 "The presentence investigation report
revealed that Elliott had five prior DUI convictions, all committed within
a 5-year period. The first three prior DUI convictions occurred in
October 1994 in municipal court and were listed as misdemeanors.
549
The fourth prior DUI conviction, also listed as a misdemeanor, occurred
in February 1996 in municipal court. 550 The fifth prior DUI conviction
occurred in September 1998 in district court and was listed as a felony.551
Chapter 8, section 1567 of the Kansas Statutes states that the first
DUI conviction constitutes a class B misdemeanor and the second a class
552A misdemeanor. Upon a third DUI conviction, however, the
541. Id. (citing State v. Horn, 892 P.2d 513 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995)).
542. Id. at 402.
543. Id.
544. Id. at 401.
545. 133 P.3d 48 (Kan. 2006).
546. See id. at 60 (categorizing double jeopardy into three instances, all of which involve the
same offense).





552. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1567(d)-(e) (Supp. 2006).
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defendant "shall be guilty of a nonperson felony., 553  Because it
constitutes a felony, the district court has exclusive jurisdiction over any
DUI conviction where the defendant has two or more prior DUI
convictions.554 In filing a written objection to criminal history, Elliott
argued that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction over those convictions
that should have been charged as felonies.555 It is clear that the trial court
should have charged Elliott's fourth DUI conviction as a felony.
Similarly, Elliott argued that, because the first three convictions occurred
on the same day making it impossible to determine an order, all three
should also be stricken from his criminal history.556 Therefore, Elliott
requested that the trial court sentence him as a second-time DUI
offender, rather than a sixth-time offender. 57  The Kansas Supreme
Court upheld the trial court's decision to strike two of Elliott's prior DUI
convictions from his criminal history score. 558 As a result, Elliott was
convicted as only a fourth-time offender under section 1567(g).
559
The jurisdiction of municipal and district courts is fixed by statute.56°
Chapter 12, section 4104 of the Kansas Statutes states that municipal
courts "shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine cases involving
violations of the ordinances of the city.' '56 1 On the other hand, chapter
22, section 2601 of the Kansas Statutes grants district courts the
"exclusive jurisdiction to try all cases of felony and other criminal cases
under the laws of the state of Kansas. 562 Taken together, the statutes
direct all felony crimes to be charged and tried solely in district courts
and not in municipal courts. 63
The Kansas Supreme Court has previously recognized that "[a]n
objection based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at
any time, whether it be for the first time on appeal or even upon the
appellate court's own motion." 564  Because of this, a jurisdictional
553. Id. § 8-1567(0.
554. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2601 (1995) ("The district court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to try all cases of felony ... .
555. Elliott, 133 P.3d at 1254.
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. Id. at 1254, 1259.
559. Id. at 1254.
560. Id. at 1255.
561. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-4104 (1995).
562. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2601 (1995).
563. City of Junction City v. Cadoret, 946 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Kan. 1997).
564. Rivera v. Cimarron Dairy, 988 P.2d 235, 238 (Kan. 1999) (citing State v. Nelson, 946 P.2d
1355, 1356 (Kan. 1997)).
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challenge such as that made in Elliott is not subject to the usual bar on
collateral attacks of prior convictions.
While seemingly unfair from a criminal justice standpoint, the Elliot
decision was likely correct. Previous convictions that have been proven
invalid should not be used to enhance a defendant's criminal history
classification during sentencing. The Elliot decision will likely have
implications in other situations where an increased charge due to prior
convictions is called for by statute.
F. Joinder and Severance
The charging of multiple crimes as separate counts in one complaint
is authorized by chapter 22, section 3202(1) of the Kansas Statutes. This
section states that
[t]wo or more crimes may be charged against a defendant in the same
complaint, information or indictment in a separate count for each crime
if the crimes charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of
the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction
or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.
565
In State v. Bunyard, the Kansas Supreme Court addressed the denial
of a criminal defendant's motion to sever three rape charges into three
separate trials. 566 The decision that charges be joined or severed for trial
is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of such discretion.567 In Bunyard,
the defendant relied on chapter 60, section 455 of the Kansas Statutes to
support his motion for separate trials.568 Section 455, which regulates the
admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts or crimes, states that such
evidence is admissible only to prove a material fact such as motive,
opportunity, intent, or identity.569 Citing its previous decision in State v.
Barksdale, the Bunyard court rejected this argument, stating that
"'Kansas case law and the provisions of [section] 22-3203(1) make it
clear that joinder is not dependent upon the other crimes being joined
meeting the admissibility test set forth in [section] 60-455. '57° Had the
565. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3202(1) (1995).
566. State v. Bunyard, 133 P.3d 14, 18 (Kan. 2006).
567. Id. at 20 (quoting State v. Hill, 895 P.2d 1238, Syl. 3 (Kan. 1995)).
568. Id. at 19.
569. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-455 (1995).
570. Bunyard, 133 P.3d at 21-22 (quoting State v. Barksdale, 973 P.2d 165, 173 (Kan. 1999)).
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court severed the three rape charges into separate trials, evidence of each
charge would not be admissible in the separate trials because it would not
likely satisfy section 455. However, in a single trial, section 455 would
not prevent the presentation of evidence concerning all three charges
simultaneously.
In general, joinder of similar crimes is the rule, while severance is
the exception. 57' The burden is on the criminal defendant to show
special circumstances that illustrate why severance is necessary.572 The
charges to be joined may be "'of the same general character, requiring
the same mode of trial, the same kind of evidence, and the same kind of
punishment.' 5 73 "The 'same or similar character' language of [section]
22-3202(1) does not limit joinder to only those crimes that are clones of
each other," nor is there any case law suggesting that cases must be of
equal strength or weakness to be joined.574
Joinder of two or more defendants is authorized by chapter 22,
section 3202(3) of the Kansas Statutes and subject to requirements
similar to those concerning the joinder of charges. Section 3202(3)
provides for the charging of codefendants in the same complaint.575
Additionally, case law allows for consolidation when codefendants are
charged with the same crime in separate complaints. 576 In State v. Boyd,
three defendants were charged with the same crime under separate
complaints.577 The cases were then consolidated for trial.578 The court
recognized that, even though the requirements of joinder are technically
satisfied, trials should not be consolidated if any defendant will be
prejudiced by the joinder.5 7 9 "Separate trials should be conducted upon a
showing of actual prejudice stemming from a joint trial and, in such a
circumstance, the trial court should not join the complaints or, if the
complaints have been joined, should sever the cases for trial.,
580
571. Id. at 23.
572. Id.
573. Id. at 20 (quoting Barksdale, 973 P.2d at 171-72).
574. Id. at 23.
575. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3202(3) (1995).
576. State v. Boyd, 127 P.3d 998, 1007 (Kan. 2006).
577. Id. at 1004.
578. Id.
579. Id. at 1008.
580. Id. (citing State v. Aikins, 932 P.2d 408, 422 (Kan. 1997)).
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When determining whether a joint trial is sufficiently prejudicial as
to mandate severance or nonjoinder, a court should consider whether
"(1) the defendants have antagonistic defenses; (2) important evidence
in favor of one of the defendants which would be admissible on a
separate trial would not be allowed on a joint trial; (3) evidence
incompetent as to one defendant and introducible against another would
work prejudicially to the former with the jury; (4) the confession by
one defendant, if introduced and proved, would be calculated to
prejudice the jury against the others; (5) one of the defendants who
could give evidence for the whole or some of the other defendants
would become a competent and compellable witness on the separate
trials of such other defendants. "
581
G. The Arraignment
The arraignment is "the formal act of calling the defendant before a
court having jurisdiction to impose sentence for the offense charged,
informing the defendant of the offense with which the defendant is




A criminal defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendere is governed
by chapter 22, section 3210 of the Kansas Statutes. By entering a plea of
guilty, a defendant "waives certain fundamental constitutional rights,
including the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to
trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers." 583 Additionally,
for such a waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, "it must be
,an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege.'9 584 Accordingly, subsections 3210(a)(2) and (3) require the
court to inform the defendant that entering the guilty plea effectively
waives these constitutional rights.585 The court must also confirm that
581. Id. (quoting State v. White, 67 P.3d 138, Syl. 2 (Kan. 2003)).
582. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2202(3) (1995).
583. State v. Moses, 127 P.3d 330, 335 (Kan. 2006) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
243 (1969)).




the defendant has "voluntarily entered the plea with an understanding of
the consequences. 586
In State v. Moses, the Kansas Supreme Court addressed the denial of
a defendant's postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea.587 Motions
to withdraw pleas are controlled by section 3210(d), which states that
"[a] plea of guilty or nolo contendere, for good cause shown and within
the discretion of the court, may be withdrawn at any time before sentence
is adjudged., 588 The statute additionally provides that a court may, after
sentencing, permit the defendant to withdraw a plea to correct "manifest
injustice." 589 "The decision to deny a motion to withdraw a plea.., lies
within the discretion of the trial court, and that decision will not be
disturbed . . . absent a showing of abuse of [such] discretion." 590 In
Moses, the defendant had signed a written plea petition that set forth the
constitutional rights waived by the plea.59' The court determined,
however, that this document alone cannot serve as a substitute for having
the court personally inform the defendant of the consequences of
entering a plea and the court's determination that the defendant
understands those consequences.592
The failure of a court to strictly follow the procedures of section
32 10 will not automatically result in a successful withdrawal of a plea.593
The court must consider the totality of the circumstances, through a
review of the complete record, to determine whether such failure
constitutes reversible error. 5 94  The Moses court affirmed the district
court's decision refusing to allow Moses to withdraw his guilty pleas and
reviewed several factors supporting that decision, including the fact that
Moses's counsel at the time of his plea had explained the guilty plea
petition in detail.595
While being personally informed by the court is the most reliable
method of ensuring a criminal defendant understands his or her waiver of
rights, other methods should be sufficient. As in Moses, a reviewing
court should consider discussions between the criminal defendant and the
586. Id.
587. Id. at 331.
588. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3210(d) (Supp. 2006).
589. Id.
590. Moses, 127 P.3d at 334 (citing State v. Muriithi, 46 P.3d 1145, 1148 (Kan. 2002); State v.
Stough, 41 P.3d 281, 285 (Kan. 2002)).
591. Id. at 336.
592. Id. at 336-37.
593. Id. at 335-36.
594. Id. at 337.
595. Id. at 338.
2007)
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
defense attorney as providing a satisfactory explanation of the
consequences associated with entering a guilty plea. There should be no
finding of manifest injustice when a criminal defendant is asked by the
trial judge whether he or she had been fully informed of the nature of his
or her guilty plea and the rights he or she will be surrendering as a result
of the agreement.
A direct appeal of a defendant's guilty plea is controlled by section
3602(a). This section states that "[n]o appeal shall be taken by the
defendant from a judgment of conviction before a district judge upon a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere, except that jurisdictional or other
grounds going to the legality of the proceedings may be raised by the
defendant as provided in K.S.A. 60-1507 and amendments thereto. 596
Additionally, "[a] defendant may not file a direct appeal from a guilty
plea unless the defendant first files a motion to withdraw the plea and the
trial court denies the motion."
597
I. Discovery
Prosecutors have an obligation, pursuant to the Due Process Clause,
to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant, "even when no
request for the disclosure has been made., 598 Kansas courts are bound by
the United States Supreme Court decision in Brady v. Maryland99 in
determining prosecutorial misconduct for failure to disclose evidence.6 °0
Brady held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 60'
Failure by the prosecution to disclose evidence as required by Brady
warrants a reversal only if the withheld evidence is material, and
"evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different., 60 2 The Kansas Supreme Court, in State v.
Adams, recounted three scenarios in which the Brady standard applies:
596. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3602(a) (Supp. 2006).
597. State v. Thorpe, 141 P.3d 521, 523 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006), review denied, No. 04-93563-A,
2006 Kan. LEXIS 778 (Kan. Dec. 19, 2006).
598. State v. Adams, 124 P.3d 19, 26 (Kan. 2005) (citing State v. Kelly, 531 P.2d 60, 63 (Kan.
1975)).
599. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
600. Adams, 124 P.3d at 26 (citing Brady).
601. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
602. Haddock v. State, 146 P.3d 187, 21! (Kan. 2006).
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"(1) where there is a deliberate bad faith suppression for the purpose of
obstructing the defense or intentional failure to disclose evidence which
has high probative vaiue" and whih could have not escaped the
prosecutor's attention; (2) where there is a deliberate refusal to honor a
request for evidence where the evidence is material to guilt or
punishment, irrespective of the prosecutor's good or bad faith in
refusing the request; and (3) where suppression was not deliberate and
no request for evidence was made, but where hindsight discloses that it
was so material that the defense could have put the evidence to
significant use.
' 6 °3
The scenarios presented in Adams fall into a sliding scale whereby
the "required degree of the evidence's materiality to the defendant's case
increases as the classification of the level of intent supporting the State's
conduct decreases. 60 4 The first category, involving deliberate bad faith
on the part of the State, "requires a fairly low showing of materiality."
60 5
The third category, involving inadvertent suppression and no request by
the defendant, requires a high degree of materiality in order for the court
to find a due process violation.
60 6
J. Pretrial Motions and Pretrial Conference
Motions to suppress illegally seized evidence "shall be made before
trial" unless the opportunity did not exist or the defendant was not aware
of the grounds for the motion. 607 Such a motion "may be made before or
during a preliminary examination. ' 60 8 The court must "receive evidence
on any issue of fact necessary to determine the motion" and the
prosecution has the burden of showing that any search and seizure were
lawful.6 09
In State v. Bieker,61 0 the Kansas Court of Appeals analyzed the
district court's failure to hold a separate hearing in ruling upon the
defendant's second motion to suppress evidence. 61 1 Defendant Bieker
was charged with possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia.6 12 "Prior
603. Adams, 124 P.3d at 26 (quoting Kelly, 531 P.2d at 63).
604. Id.
605. Id.
606. Id. (citing Kelly, 531 P.2d at 64).
607. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3216(3) (1995).
608. Id. § 22-3216(4).
609. Id. § 22-3216(2).
610. 132 P.3d 478 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006), review denied, No. 04-93487-A, 2006 Kan. LEXIS 534





to the preliminary hearing, [Bieker] filed a motion to suppress any
incriminating statements [made] in violation of his Miranda rights.
Following the presentation of the State's evidence at the preliminary
hearing, the district court denied the motion to suppress. 6 13  Bieker
subsequently "filed another motion to suppress, this time challenging the
lawfulness of the search and seizure. ' 614  A second hearing was then
scheduled.615 However, at the outset of testimony, the court continued
the hearing, stating that the issue had sufficiently been addressed during
the preliminary hearing.6 16 Before the date on which the hearing was to
resume, "the district court filed a journal entry, indicating that the second
motion to suppress was denied because the issue. .. had previously been
resolved by the preliminary hearing.'
6 17
"A rehearing on a motion to suppress is generally left to the sound
discretion of the district court., 6 18 "'Normally, . . . the motion, when
made before trial, will be heard once and disposed of; however, if at trial
new or additional evidence is produced bearing on the issue of
substantially affecting the credibility of the evidence adduced at the
pretrial hearing of the motion, . . . [section 22-3216] authorizes
reentertainment of the motion in the court's discretion."' 6 1 9 The court of
appeals adopted the abuse of discretion standard of review in the event of
a district court's refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing on a second
motion to suppress filed after the preliminary hearing.620 Because Bieker
did not present additional evidence in the second motion to suppress, but
rather relied on testimony offered at the preliminary hearing, there was
621no abuse of discretion.
IV. TRIAL RIGHTS
A. Speedy Trial
There are two sources of speedy trial rights in Kansas: statutory and
constitutional. The general statutory provisions are found in chapter 22,






618. Id. at 482 (citing State v. Holmes, 102 P.3d 406, 420 (Kan. 2004)).
619. Id. (quoting Holmes, 102 P.3d at 420) (alteration in original).




protections arise from the Sixth Amendment: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial. 622 The
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides protection before a
defendant has been arrested or charged.623
1. Statutory Rights
Kansas defines by statute the number of days the State has to bring
the defendant to trial. The time depends upon whether the defendant is
in jail awaiting trial,624 out on bail, 625 or in jail serving time for another
62conviction. 26 Absent a continuance granted by the court, if the
defendant is not brought to trial within the allotted time, he shall be
discharged from liability from the charges with prejudice. 627 The court
may extend the statutory time (1) upon request of the defendant, 628 (2) if
the defendant is the cause of the delay,629 (3) if the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial, (4) if evidence is unavailable in time for trial,
or (5) if it would be a burden on the court to proceed within the specified
time.63°
In State v. Garcia,631 the defendant challenged a series of
continuances, claiming his speedy trial rights under the Kansas statute
had been violated.632 The defendant was arraigned for multiple counts of
633first-degree murder on October 14, 2003. Upon motions by the
defendant, the trial was continued until February 2, 2004.634 The court
then continued the trial until May 17 upon the State's motions.6  One
hundred and five days elapsed between February 2 and May 17.636 The
622. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
623. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... ").
624. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3402(1) (Supp. 2006) (within ninety days of arraignment).
625. See id. § 22-3402(2) (within 180 days of arraignment).




630. Id. § 22-3402(5).
631. 144 P.3d 684 (Kan. 2006).
632. Id. at 690.






district court had granted continuances to allow the State to have DNA
testing done at a FBI laboratory, instead of a faster, more expensive
private lab.637 The issue before the court was whether it was reasonable
under section 3402(5)(c) 638 to continue the trial beyond the statutorily
defined speedy-trial period when the cost of obtaining the State's
evidence on time would have been prohibitive. This specific issue had
not been confronted before in Kansas. Because the cost of testing at the
private lab would have been "prohibitive," the Kansas Supreme Court
held that the decision to continue the trial was reasonable.639
2. Constitutional Protections
The constitutional protections are provided through the United States
Constitution 640 and Article X of the Kansas Constitution.64 1  Kansas
courts have relied on United States Supreme Court precedent when
deciding speedy-trial cases. Delay in arresting defendant and filing
charges does not violate the speedy-trial rights, although this may violate
the defendant's due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
Barker v. Wingo642 states the test used in Kansas for analyzing
speedy-trial challenges. Four factors are considered: (1) the length of the
delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his or
her right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. 643 State v. Brown held
that the Barker test would apply in Kansas speedy-trial cases.644 Kansas
has declined to adopt bright-line rules fixing how long of a delay is too
long. For example, in State v. Mathenia, a twenty-three-month delay
was not prejudicial where the State's case was exceedingly complex. 45
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that an eight-year delay
is presumptively prejudicial.6 46
637. Id.
638. A trial may be continued beyond the speedy trial period when "[tihere is material evidence
which is unavailable; ... reasonable efforts have been made to procure such evidence; and ... there
are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence can be obtained and trial commenced within the
next succeeding 90 days." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3402(5)(c) (Supp. 2006).
639. Garcia, 144 P.3d at 693.
640. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial .... ").
641. See KAN. CONST. art. X ("In all prosecutions, the accused shall be allowed to ... have.., a
speedy public trial .... ").
642. 407 U.S. 514(1972).
643. Id. at 530-32.
644. State v. Brown, 823 P.2d 190, 196 (Kan. 1991).
645. State v. Mathenia, 942 P.2d 624, 627 (Kan. 1997).
646. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657-58 (1992).
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In State v. Weaver, the defendant objected to the State's continuance
after a ten-month delay; the trial started four months after his
objection. 47 The Kansas Supreme Court applied the Barker factors and
was strongly persuaded by the fact that the defendant was on bail prior to
trial, and had not objected to the delay until ten months after his arrest
leading to a finding of minimal prejudice to the defendant and upholding
of his sentence.
648
The speedy-trial clock starts when a defendant is arrested or charged
in the federal system.649 In Kansas, section 3402(1) instructs that a
defendant's speedy-trial clock begins at arraignment. Without a showing
of necessity, the State may not avoid its speedy-trial obligations under
section 3402 when it dismisses charges against the defendant, and later
refiles the same charges.
650
If a speedy-trial violation occurs, the remedy is dismissal of the
charges or vacating the sentence.65
3. Prearrest Delay
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment-not the speedy-
trial clause of the Sixth-protects defendants from unreasonable
prearrest delays. The Supreme Court of the United States and Kansas
Supreme Court have held that the defendant must show prejudice and an
improper motive to prevail on this charge. In State v. Royal,652 the
Kansas Supreme Court held that "due process rights may be said to have
been denied by reason of pre-accusation delay, where it is shown that
actual prejudice resulted to the defendant in his ability to conduct his
defense and that the government intentionally delayed prosecution to
gain a tactical advantage over him."
653
B. Trial by Jury
There are two sources of trial-by-jury rights in Kansas: statutory and
constitutional. Kansas statutes provide that all felony cases shall be tried
647. State v. Weaver, 78 P.3d 397, 398-99 (Kan. 2003).
648. Id. at 402-03.
649. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 862 (1978).
650. State v. Clemence, 145 P.3d 931, 937 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006), review denied, No. 04-92114-
A, 2007 Kan. LEXIS 121 (Kan. Feb. 14, 2007).
651. See, e.g., State v. George, 65 P.3d 1060, 1063 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003) (case remanded with
orders to dismiss charges).




by a jury of twelve members, unless the defendant, the State, and the
court consent either to a bench trial or that the jury shall be fewer than
twelve persons.654 Misdemeanor and traffic offenses are tried to the
court, unless the defendant requests a jury trial within seven days of
notice of trial assignment. 655 Traffic infractions and trials in municipal
court are also tried to the court.656
1. General Requirements
The right to jury trial in the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution is incorporated and therefore enforceable against the
states.6 57 The Sixth Amendment requires a jury in all cases where the
possible punishment is greater than six months in prison.658  The
Supreme Court of the United States has upheld juries of six persons.
659
Injuries of twelve, the Court has upheld less-than-unanimous verdicts.
660
In State v. Sykes,66' the defendant was charged with misdemeanor
theft and faced twelve months in jail.662 The defendant failed to submit a
timely request for a jury trial per chapter 22, section 3404(1) of the
Kansas Statutes. 663 The district court proceeded with a bench trial over
the defendant's objection. On appeal, the conviction was overturned.664
The appellate court held that the defendant's failure to submit a timely
request for a jury trial did not amount to a valid waiver of the right to a
jury trial. When the possible sentence is greater than six months in jail,
the defendant is entitled to a jury trial under the United States
Constitution, absent a knowing waiver.665 Consequently, when the
possible punishment is greater than six months, the requirement in
section 3404(1) that the defendant's jury request be timely is moot.
654. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3403(1)-(2) (1995).
655. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3404 (Supp. 2006). This requirement is effectively mooted in cases
where the possible punishment is greater than six months in jail. See infra notes 658-60 and
accompanying text.
656. § 22-3404(3), (5).
657. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 67 (1970).
658. Id. at 73-74.
659. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970).
660. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972) (upholding verdicts of I1-1 and 10-2).
661. 132 P.3d 485 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006), review denied, No. 05-94075-A, 2006 Kan. LEXIS 504
(Kan. Sept. 19, 2006).
662. Id. at 489.
663. Id. at 492. Section 3404(1) requires that a written request for a jury trial be submitted no
later than seven days after the trial is assigned. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3404(1) (Supp. 2006).
664. Sykes, 132 P.3d at491.




The Sixth Amendment requires that the jury be a fair cross-section of
the community. "Large distinctive groups" such as minorities and
women may not be categorically excluded nor substantially
underrepresented. In Duren v. Missouri,666 the United States Supreme
Court invalidated a rule where women could opt out of juries upon
request. 667 As a result of this rule, although women composed fifty-four
percent of the general population, only fifteen percent of venirepersons
were women. 668 Duren stated the test for determining a violation of thefair cross-section requirement:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the
community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from
which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the
number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the
jury-selection process.
66 9
Missouri's rule, which resulted in the clear statistical underrepresentation
of women on jury panels, violated the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-
section requirement.
670
State v. Baker671 exemplifies the application of Duren in Kansas.
The defendant argued that persons age sixty and over were
overrepresented in jury panels, and moved to have his jury dismissed.6 72
Thirty-five percent of the venirepersons in the defendant's case were age
sixty or above.6 73  The defendant challenged the process by which
persons called for jury duty could be excused.674  The court
acknowledged that younger people were more likely to have valid
exemptions. 675 "People charged with care of small children are generally
in the under 60 category as are persons whose presence at their
employment is required for public welfare, health, or safety (policemen,
666. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
667. Id. at 360.
668. Id. at 362.
669. Id. at 364.
670. Id. at 360.
671. 819 P.2d 1173 (Kan. 1991).






firemen, etc.). ' 6 76 Fatal to the defendant's request was the absence of
evidence of systematic exclusion in the jury-selection process. 6  It was
not enough that one distinctive group is over- or underrrpresented; there
must be systematic exclusion of a distinctive group.
3. Peremptory Challenges
Batson v. Kentucky678  involved a prosecutor who struck
venirepersons of the same race as the defendant. 679 This procedure was
found to be impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 680 The Court held that the defendant must first
establish a prima facie case by showing that members of his racial group
were excluded. 68' The burden then shifts to the prosecutor to offer a
682race-neutral explanation. The court then must decide whether the
prosecutor's explanation is worthy of credence.683  Batson has been
expanded to the purposeful exclusion of venirepersons based on race by
the defendant684 and exclusion based on gender.
685
A Batson challenge on appeal is difficult to prove. Any nonracial
explanation may be offered by the prosecutor, and significant deference
is given to the trial judge's determination. The prosecutor in State v.
Pham struck two Hispanic venirepersons.686 The defendant challenged
the strikes under Batson. The prosecutor claimed that he struck the first
juror because he did not answer questions posed to the panel. 687 For
example, he did not say that being a juror would be burdensome despite
the fact that he was the only clerk who operated a liquor store during the
day.688 The second venireperson was struck because she was concerned
about her English comprehension. 689 The appellate court reviewed the
challenges for abuse of discretion and gave latitude to the trial judge in
determining the prosecutor's credibility. In Pham, the appellate court
676. Id. at 1180-81.
677. ld. at 1181.
678. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
679. Id. at 82-83.
680. Id. at 107.
681. Id. at 95.
682. Id. at 97.
683. Id. at 98.
684. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).
685. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994).
686. State v. Pham, 136 P,3d 919, 928 (Kan. 2006).





found that these explanations were legitimate, and that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion.69 °
When the court erroneously fails to strike potential jurors for cause,
the defendant's use of a peremptory strike on the challenged juror cures
the court's error and deprives the defendant of a further remedy. In State
691v. Ackward, the defendant challenged two potential jurors for cause.
One had been a victim of armed robbery-the charge in the instant
case-and the other was a police officer who knew several of the
692witnesses. The district court denied defendant's motions to strike for
cause. 6 9 3 The defendant then used two peremptory challenges to remove
the two prospective jurors. 694 The issue before the appellate court was
whether the jury that actually heard the case was impartial. 695 Thus, it
was irrelevant that the defendant was required to use peremptory
challenges to correct the district court's error.696 The defendant admitted
that he could not "definitively say" that the jury that tried his case was
not impartial; thus, his conviction was upheld.697
C. Other Trial Rights
1. Public Trial
The Sixth Amendment provides that criminal defendants have the
right to a public trial,698 This Amendment has been incorporated and is
applicable to states. In State v. Dixon, the Kansas Supreme Court held
that the defendant had been denied this right when his verdict was read in
a closed courtroom.6 99 In Dixon, one prosecution team consecutively
prosecuted two defendants for the same charges.700 In order to prevent
the second defendant's jury from being contaminated by the verdict from
the first defendant's trial, the judge closed the courtroom to the public for
the verdict. 701 On appeal, the defendant conceded that the right to public
690. Id.







698. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
699. State v. Dixon, 112 P.3d 883, 909 (Kan. 2005).




proceedings was not absolute.7 °2 At times, "'the defendant's right to a
fair trial or the government's interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive
information"' may outweigh the need for public proceedings.70 3 A
decision to close proceedings, however, is subject to strict scrutiny.7 °4
After discussing the interests at stake and the available alternatives, the
court concluded that the defendant's right to a public trial had been
violated.70 5  The court reversed and remanded after finding that
706deprivation of this right was not harmless error.
2. Confrontation
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states that
defendants shall have the right to be confronted with the witnesses
against them. 70 7 In State v. Boyd, the defendant argued that she was
denied her right to confront the child-victim witness when the witness
testified via closed-circuit television.70 8  The United States Supreme
Court held this type of testimony does not violate the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment in Maryland v. Craig, which specifically
upheld the constitutionality of Maryland's closed-circuit testimony
statute. 7 09  Interpreting Kansas's closed-circuit testimony statute, the
Kansas Supreme Court determined that the district court abused its
discretion by allowing the closed-circuit testimony against Boyd.710
First, the State's expert testified that the children would be traumatized
by testifying against Boyd's two codefendants-the witnesses' parents-
but not against Boyd herself.71' Second, in denying Boyd's motion to
sever the trial, the district court impermissibly considered the general
trauma caused by requiring the child witnesses to testify more than
once. 71 2 The legally relevant consideration is whether the presence of the
702. Id.
703. Id. at 907 (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39,45 (1984)).
704. See id. at 908 ("'[I]t must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling
governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.' (quoting Press-Enterprise Co.
v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984))).
705. Id. at 910.
706. Id.
707. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
708. State v. Boyd, 127 P.3d 998, 1009 (Kan. 2006).
709. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990).
710. Boyd, 127 P.3dat 1011.




defendant is the source of the trauma to the witness, not whether the
testimony itself would be traumatic.
71 3
In State v. Torres,714 the Kansas Supreme Court settled a question
left open after the United States Supreme Court case Crawford v.
Washington.715 In Crawford, the Court announced that the Confrontation
Clause forbids all testimonial statements of an unavailable witness unless
the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine that witness.716 The
defendant in Torres argued that his statements to police were
inadmissible because the defendant-invoking his Fifth Amendment
right to silence-was unavailable and had not been cross-examined.
71 7
The Kansas Supreme Court held that the Crawford rule was "clearly
discussing interrogations of people other than the defendant. 718
In a second Kansas case interpreting Crawford, the issue was
whether a nontestifying witness's statement to officers that the defendant
"usually carried weapons" was testimonial. 71 9 The defendant in State v.
Araujo argued that the statement was testimonial, and as such, it was
inadmissible under Crawford.720 The Kansas Court of Appeals agreed
with the district court that the statement was not testimonial: it was
offered at trial not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to
demonstrate the officer's state of mind when arresting the defendant.721
3. The Defendant's Right to Testify
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment gives a
defendant the absolute right to testify on his own behalf. The right to
testify may not be denied by defendant's counsel. A defendant's right to
present evidence is subject to reasonable restrictions, however.
In State v. McFadden, 2 the defendant claimed that his right to
testify had been abridged by the court's decision to forbid him from
testifying about his own medical condition.723 The defendant was
713. Id. at 1009-10 (applying the test stated in State v. Chisholm, 825 P.2d 147 (Kan. 1992)).
714. 121 P.3d 429 (Kan. 2005).
715. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
716. Id. at 58.
717. Torres, 121 P.3d at 438.
718. Id.
719. State v. Araujo, 144 P.3d 66, 68, 71 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006), review granted, No. 05-94831-
AS, 2007 Kan. LEXIS 29 (Kan. Feb. 13, 2007).
720. Id. at 71-72.
721. Id. at 73.
722. 122 P.3d 384 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005).
723. Id. at 387.
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prosecuted for driving under the influence.724 He attempted to testify that
his medical condition would make him appear intoxicated although he
was not.72 5  The district court held that the testimony would be
impermissible expert testimony by a lay witness.72 6 The court of appeals
characterized the ruling as an evidentiary one, and thus subject to an
abuse of discretion review.727 The court found no abuse of discretion and
affirmed.728
D. Right to Remain Silent: Self-Incrimination
1. Generally
The Fifth Amendment states that no person shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself.729 The right against self-incrimination applies
only to testimony which is compelled, testimonial, and incriminating.
730
This protection includes the right of the defendant not to take the stand as
a witness. 1 The right is personal; it does not protect corporations.732
The self-incrimination clause prohibits only communications that are
testimonial.733  Testimonial communications either "explicitly or
implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information., 734 Thus,
compelled blood samples or handwriting samples are not testimonial.
Only when the witness is required "to disclose the contents of his own
mind" 735 is the self-incrimination clause at issue. In State v.
Wahweotten,736 the defendant objected to evidence that he refused to take
a breathalyzer test.737 The results of a breathalyzer test would not be
testimonial, but the defendant argued that his refusal to take the test was
testimonial.738 In accordance with Kansas and United States Supreme
724. Id. at 386.
725. Id.
726. Id. at 387.
727. Id.
728. Id. at 388.
729. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
730. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 207 (1988).
731. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-423 (1995).
732. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104-05 (1988).
733. Doe, 487 U.S. at 207.
734. Id. at 210.
735. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957).
736. 143 P.3d 58 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006), review denied, No. 05-94523-A, 2007 Kan. LEXIS 59
(Kan. Feb. 13, 2007).
737. Id. at 63-64.
738. Id. at 64-65.
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Court precedent, the court held that "the refusal to submit to a breath test
was not a communicative statement and thus was not protected by the
Fifth Amendment."
739
Compelled communications are prohibited. Thus, a criminal
defendant may not be required to testify against himself at trial. Further,
a witness who is protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege may refuse
to answer questions, unless and until the witness is protected "at least
against the use of his compelled answers and evidence derived therefrom
in any subsequent criminal case in which he is a defendant. Absent such
protection, if he is nevertheless compelled to answer, his answers are
inadmissible against him in a later ciminal prosecution.
740
Finally, the testimony must incriminate the witness. 741  Testimony
incriminating the witness's best friend or child does not necessarily
compel the witness to incriminate herself. Testimony regarding acts that
are embarrassing also do not implicate Fifth Amendment protection.742
2. Immunity
Immunity is a tool that the government may use to compel testimony
that would otherwise be protected by the Fifth Amendment's protection
against self-incrimination. Chapter 22, section 3415 of the Kansas
Statutes provides for two kinds of immunity: transactional and use.
Under transactional immunity, the statute provides: "Any person granted
transactional immunity shall not be prosecuted for any crime which has
been committed for which such immunity is granted or for any other
transactions arising out of the same incident. '743 Under use immunity:
"Any person granted use and derivative use immunity may be prosecuted
for any crime, but the state shall not use any testimony against such
person provided under a grant of such immunity or any evidence derived
from such testimony." 7"
A witness granted use immunity may be prosecuted for any crime,
but the immunized testimony and fruits thereof may not be used at his
trial.745 A witness is given transactional immunity with respect to a
739. Id. at 68.
740. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973) (citation omitted).
741. See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 124 (1957) (stating that one cannot be lawfully
compelled "to condemn himself by his own oral testimony").
742. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 353 (1974).
743. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3415(b)(1) (Supp. 2006) (emphasis added).
744. Id. § 22-3415(b)(2) (emphasis added).
745. Kastigarv. United States, 406 U.S. 441,448-49 (1972).
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particular crime or incident; in exchange for his testimony, the witness
746may not be prosecuted for the specified crime. Once granted
immunity-either use or transactional-the witness may not refuse to
answer questions based on Fifth Amendment grounds.747
3. Comments on the Defendant's Silence
The prosecution may not comment on the defendant's invocation of
his right to silence. 748  Comments that the defendant, who has invoked
his right to silence, does not appear remorseful are also prohibited by the
self-incrimination clause, if "the prosecutor [attempts] to use evidence of
the defendant's courtroom behavior where the defendant has exercised
his right not to testify.,
749
E. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
The Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt to
support a criminal conviction. Every fact required to support the
conviction must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The requirement
arises from the defendant's right to due process.75° Unless legislative
intent indicates otherwise, the burden rests upon the defendant to prove
an affirmative defense, such as duress. 5
F. Other Kansas Trial Issues.
1. Motion for Acquittal
The defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal at the close of
the prosecution's case. If the judge finds from the evidence that "a
reasonable mind might fairly decide a defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt" then the judge must deny the motion.752 A motion to
set aside the verdict may be made after the jury's verdict.
746. Id. at 453.
747. Id. at 462.
748. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965). In 2005, the Kansas Supreme Court,
guided by Griffin, held that the prosecutor may not highlight the defendant's communications with
his attorney to infer consciousness of his guilt. State v. Dixon, 112 P.3d 883, 904 (Kan. 2005).
749. State v. Kleypas, 40 P.3d 139, 280 (Kan. 2001).
750. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
751. Dixon v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2437, 2442 (2006).
752. State v. Wiggett, 44 P.3d 381, 385-86 (Kan. 2002).
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2. Submission of the Case to the Jury
When an outside party has tampered with a jury, a mistrial may be
the proper remedy. Rules of evidence bar a juror from testifying about
"the effect of any statement, conduct, event or condition upon the mind
of a juror as influencing him or her to assent to or dissent from the
verdict . . . or concerning the mental processes by which it was
determined."
753
If a jury becomes deadlocked a court may give the jury an Allen
754
instruction. An Allen instruction can provoke a stalled jury into making
a decision. The charge generally instructs the jury about the burden of
having to retry the case, and it may state that there is no reason to believe
that another jury will make a better decision than the current one. When
given before deliberations have begun, coercive effect is not a concern.
However, when the instruction is given after deliberations have begun,
the Kansas Supreme Court has held that the instruction could exert undue
influence on the jury.755 The content and timing of the instruction might
rise to reversible error. For example, in State v. Troy756 after less than
two hours of deliberations, the judge gave an Allen instruction to a
deadlocked jury.75 7 The Kansas Supreme Court suggested that the
instruction was improper because it coerced or restrained the jury's
deliberations, but it declined to reverse the conviction because the
defendant failed to object when the charge was given.758
3. Mistrial
The court may declare a mistrial when (1) it is physically impossible
to proceed; (2) there is a legal defect which would make the verdict
reversible as a matter of law; (3) prejudicial conduct, in or out of the
courtroom, would cause injustice to either the defense or the prosecution;
(4) the jury cannot agree on a verdict; (5) false statements of a juror on
voir dire prevent a fair trial; or (6) the defendant's competency is to be
753. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-441 (1995).
754. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
755. State v. Makthepharak, 78 P.3d 412, 417 (Kan. 2003) (citing State v. Struzik, 5 P.3d 502,
514 (Kan. 2000)).
756. 524 P.2d 1121 (Kan. 1974).
757. Id. at 1124.
758. Id. at 1124-25.
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The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall "be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy., 76' The protection of
double jeopardy encompasses three distinct rights: the defendant may not
be retried for the same offense after a conviction, retried for the same
offense after an acquittal, nor shall the defendant receive multiple
punishments for the same offense.762
Jeopardy does not attach until the jury is sworn or empanelled, or, in
a bench trial, when the prosecution's first witness is sworn. 763  If an
appellate court finds that the evidence supporting a conviction is
insufficient, the State may reprosecute the defendant.764
In case of a mistrial, a second prosecution without the defendant's
consent does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause when there is
"manifest necessity" to abort the trial, such as a deadlocked jury.765 Bad
faith conduct by the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial cannot
provide manifest necessity.766
2. Multiplicity
Multiplicity involves the third category of double jeopardy
protections: multiple punishments for the same offense. When the same
conduct gives rise to criminal liability, the major difficulty for purposes
of the Double Jeopardy Clause is determining what constitutes the "same
offense." In Blockburger v. United States, the Supreme Court of the
United States established a rule for determining whether there are
multiple offenses for the same conduct: "[W]here the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the
759. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3423(1) (1995).
760. Id. § 22-3423(2).
761. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
762. State v. Yeoman, 951 P.2d 964, 965 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
763. State v. Griffin, 787 P.2d 701, 703 (Kan. 1990).
764. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982).




test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only
one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact the
other does not., 767 This rule-known as the Blockburger test-focuses
on the statutes under which the defendant is charged at issue; the
evidence at trial is immaterial to this analysis. If each offense considered
in the abstract requires proof of a fact that the other does not, then there
is no multiplicity. This rule is sometimes described as a constitutional
rule, but it is also called a canon of statutory construction.
In State v. Schoonover, the Kansas Supreme Court confronted
multiplicity in Kansas, and in particular, the court held that the single act
of violence/merger doctrine would no longer be applied in Kansas. 68
3. State v. Schoonover
Scott Schoonover was discovered passed out in his vehicle on a
country road.769 The officer that was called to the scene observed several
items in the vehicle which were consistent with the manufacture of
methamphetamine, and a search warrant for the car was issued.77 °
Schoonover was later charged with and convicted of, among other things,
possession and manufacture of methamphetamine.7 7 1
On appeal, Schoonover argued that his convictions were
multiplicitous. 772  Interpreting and applying the recent case State v.
Patten,773 the Kansas Court of Appeals upheld his conviction.774 The
Kansas Supreme Court took the opportunity to conduct an in-depth
analysis of the protections provided by the Double Jeopardy Clause, and
specifically the "single act of violence doctrine. 77 5
When the same conduct or act creates criminal liability under two or
more statutes, many jurisdictions (including Kansas and the United
States) have at times held that the defendant may only be prosecuted for
one offense under the "single act of violence doctrine." 776 For example,
in the 2004 case State v. Groves, the defendant threw a woman to the
767. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
768. State v. Schoonover, 133 P.3d 48, 77 (Kan. 2006).
769. Id. at 57.
770. Id. at 58.
771. Id. at59.
772. Id.
773. 122 P.3d 350 (Kan. 2005).
774. Schoonover, 133 P.3d at 48.
775. Id. at 59-80.
776. Id. at 62.
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ground and snatched her purse in the same motion.777 The Kansas
Supreme Court held that convictions for aggravated battery and
aggravated robbery were multiplicitous because they arose from the
same act of violence. 778  This doctrine directly conflicts with the
Blockburger test: the single act of violence doctrine examines the
evidence that is presented at trial and determines whether it is the same
evidence that supports convictions for multiple offenses, while
Blockburger looks only at the statutory elements of the crimes charged.
Schoonover argued that the evidence which supported the charges of
possession of methamphetamine and manufacture of methamphetamine
arose from the same act, and thus were multiplicitous under the single act
of violence doctrine.
779
The Kansas Supreme Court provided a detailed history of the
evolution of the Double Jeopardy Clause at the state and federal level.
The court was bothered by the confusion and inconsistency surrounding
the Double Jeopardy Clause. For example, the court discussed the single
act of violence doctrine's application in felony-murder cases.780 When
prosecuting felony murder, the State ordinarily would also charge the
defendant with the underlying felony. The court highlighted a 1981
Kansas Supreme Court rule which held that the underlying felony and
the felony-murder rule would "merge" under the single act of violence
doctrine, i.e., the defendant could only be prosecuted for the underlying
felony or the felony murder, but not both.781  The court was not
comfortable with the trend that "in most instances, the felony-murder
cases represent a departure" from the doctrine.782 The court found that
the doctrine should not apply in felony-murder cases because the
legislature did not intend for the offenses to merge, and examination of
intent is the underlying principle in the Blockburger test.
783
Schoonover is a natural extension of the court's 2005 case State v.
784Patten. Patten held that the Blockburger elements test would be
applied in Kansas in questions of multiplicity. 78 5 Patten rejected the so-
called common law test stating that the "test for whether the offenses
merge and are, therefore, multiplicitous is whether each offense charged
777. State v. Groves, 95 P.3d 95, 96 (Kan. 2004), overruled by Schoonover, 133 P.3d 48.
778. Id. at 99.
779. Schoonover, 133 P.3d at 80-81.
780. Id. at 75-77.
781. State v. Games, 624 P.2d 448, 453 (Kan. 1981), overruled by Schoonover, 133 P.3d 48.
782. Schoonover, 133 P.3d at 75.
783. Id. at 62-63, 76.
784. 122 P.3d 350 (Kan. 2005).
785. Id. at 355-56.
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requires proof of a fact not required in proving the other. 786 The focus
of the common law test is on the evidence necessarily proved at trial to
support multiple convictions, while the Blockburger test looks only at the
statutory elements of the crimes charged. The Patten court hoped to
eliminate some confusion in the lower courts which had been applying "a
mix of approaches, including examination only of the elements where the
test is stated in terms of 'proof of a fact' and examination of the proof of
a fact where the test is stated in terms of 'proof of an element.'
787
Following the logic of Patten, the Schoonover court held that the
788single act of violence doctrine would no longer be applied in Kansas.
The court listed six reasons for abolishing the rule. First, the doctrine
expands the protections of the Fifth Amendment without a reasoned
justification. Second, the Kansas Supreme Court frequently has held that
the Fifth Amendment provides the same protection as the Kansas
Constitution. Third, abolition of the doctrine reconciles felony-murder
prosecutions with the rest of the single-act-of-violence cases. Fourth,
rejection of the doctrine reconciles multiplicity cases with established
Kansas precedent regarding successive prosecution cases. Fifth,
rejection of the doctrine is consistent with chapter 21, section 3107 of the
Kansas Statutes, which deals with multiplicity prosecutions. Sixth, it
reconciles contradictory and divergent Kansas case law.789
Rejection of the merger doctrine brings Kansas law closer to the
principles underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause. The purpose of the
clause is to limit judicial power; there is nothing problematic about the
legislature authorizing multiple punishments for the same conduct. The
violation occurs when the court abuses the guidelines of the legislature
by imposing multiple unauthorized sentences. 790  The merger doctrine
unnecessarily diverts attention away from legislative intent. The best
way to determine legislative intent is not to examine the defendant's
conduct with respect to the statutes, as the merger doctrine would
require. A better method is to look at the statutes themselves to see if
they authorize multiple punishments.
Undoubtedly, Schoonover has purged Kansas case law of the
confusion and inconsistencies surrounding the merger doctrine. The
786. Id. at 353.
787. Id.
788. Schoonover, 133 P.3d at 77.
789. Id. at 77-78.
790. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983) ("With respect to cumulative sentences
imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing
court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.").
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holding provides a simple analytical framework for multiplicity
challenges. In the post-Schoonover case State v. Sanchez,79 1 the Kansas
Supreme Court faced a challenge to an arguably multiplicative
conviction of felony murder and child abuse. The court simply applied
..the same-elements test: whether each offense requires proof of an
element not necessary to prove the other offense. If so, the charges
stemming from a single act are not multiplicitous and do. not constitute a
double jeopardy violation.' 792 Because the child abuse charge required
proof that the victim was under the age of eighteen and the felony
murder required the death of the victim, the convictions were not
multiplicitous. 793  The court disposed of another case involving
convictions of aggravated criminal sodomy and rape, finding no double
jeopardy violation under Schoonover.794 These cases are noteworthy
because of the straightforward and short analysis used by the court in
considering the challenges to multiplicity.
However, Schoonover may be a simple fix to a more complex
problem. Blockburger itself seemed like a simple and straightforward
solution to multiplicity issues, but its application eventually proved
problematic. The strict elements test in Blockburger cannot fairly deal
with the facts of some cases-for example, Prince v. United States.795 In
Prince, the defendant was convicted under the Federal Bank Robbery
Act of both bank robbery and entering a bank with the intent to commit a
robbery.796 Under the Blockburger test, each crime had a mutually
independent element, and thus conviction under both would not violate
Blockburger, nor would these offenses have been multiplicitous under
Schoonover. But the Court did not end its analysis there. It considered
evidence of Congress's intent and established a default rule of lenity in
the absence of evidence of congressional intent. In so doing, it held that
the two offenses "merged," and the convictions were thus
multiplicitous. 97  The contrary result would clearly undermine
Congress's intent.
798
To account for the shortcomings of the Blockburger test, the
Supreme Court of the United States was forced to recognize that the test
791. 144 P.3d 718 (Kan. 2006).
792. Id. at 728 (quoting Schoonover, 133 P.3dat Syl. 12).
793. Id.
794. State v. Potts, 135 P.3d 1054, 1060-61 (Kan. 2006).
795. 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
796. Id. at 324.




"is simply a 'rule of statutory construction,' a guide to determining
whether the legislature intended multiple punishments."7 99  Kansas-
under Schoonover and Patten-does not require nor permit an inquiry
into congressional intent. The purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is
to prevent the sentencing court from giving a greater punishment than the
legislature intended. Blockburger announced a rule of statutory
construction; a tool whose ultimate purpose is to discern the intent of the
legislature. Kansas, therefore, ignores the ultimate purpose of the
Double Jeopardy Clause in favor of a simple rule; a mere proxy for the
crucial question. It may be the case in the vast majority of convictions
that Congress did not intend two offenses to "merge" when they contain
independent elements. However, the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a
greater punishment than Congress intended. When the Schoonover rule
fails to discern legislative intent, the court abdicates its duty by failing to
conduct an inquiry into congressional intent.
H. Appeals
The defendant may appeal any judgment against the defendant made
by the district court.800 The defendant may not appeal convictions after
nolo contendere or guilty pleas, except to challenge the legality of the
proceedings. 80 1 The prosecution may appeal four rulings: (1) an order of
dismissal; (2) an order arresting judgment; (3) a question reserved by the
prosecution; and (4) an order granting certain new trials. 80 2 Furthermore,
the prosecution may appeal an order to quash a warrant or suppress
evidence before trial and within ten days of the order.
803
I. Resentencing After Conviction
In North Carolina v. Pearce, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that it is impermissible to resentence a defendant to a harsher
punishment because the defendant appealed the conviction. 80 4  A
presumption of vindictiveness exists when the sentencer does not give
799. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 517 (1990), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
800. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3602(a) (Supp. 2006).
801. Id.
802. Id. § 22-3602(b)(1)-(4).
803. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3603 (1995).
804. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-24 (1969), overruled on other grounds by
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
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affirmative reasons for the increased sentence. °5 The Kansas case State
v. Rinck806 affirmed Pearce's central holding. The defendant in Rinck
appealed his conviction, and his second conviction was harsher than his
first conviction. 80 7 Because the sentencing judge in Rinck failed to offer
any explanation why the second sentence was greater than the first, the
second sentence was found to be vindictive and thus unconstitutional as a
matter of law.
80 8
Where the presumption of vindictiveness does not apply, the
defendant may prevail by showing actual vindictiveness.80 9  The
presumption of vindictiveness does not depend upon whether the
resentencing was imposed by the same judge or by a different one.
810
J. Postconviction Remedies
A prisoner in custody may move the sentence-imposing court to
vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence. 8 1 The motion must be made
within one year of the final order from the prisoner's direct appeal.81
The court is not required to entertain more than one motion from the
813petitioner. The prisoner may petition on the grounds that "the
judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed
was not authorized by law or is otherwise open to collateral attack, or
that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional
rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral
attack. 814 The sentencing court's decision may be appealed.81
The prisoner may also apply for federal habeas corpus relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. A federal court will entertain the motion only if the
state remedies have been exhausted and the prisoner alleges a violation
of federal law.816
805. Id. at 725-26.
806. 923 P.2d 67 (Kan. 1996).
807. Id. at 69.
808. Id. at 70.
809. Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 569 (1984); State v. Cooper, 69 P.3d 559, 563
(Kan. 2003).
810. Rinek, 923 P.2d at 73.
811. KAN, STAT. ANN. § 60-1507(a) (1995).
812. Id. § 60-1507(f)(1).
813. Id. § 60-1507(c)
814. Id. § 60-1507(b).
815. Id. § 60-1507(d).
816. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)-(b)(1) (2000).
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